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ABSTRACT 
Pakistan’s “other problem,” the insurgency of the ethnic Baloch, is 
threatening to tear the nation apart. It is an old problem with deep wounds both in 
Islamabad and among the Baloch people.  While explanations of this problem 
vary, they tend to follow two primary theories. One theory, called here the 
“Islamabad Theory,” asserts that the blame for the difficulty between Islamabad 
and the Baloch lies in the policies and strategies taken by the Pakistani 
government.  A second theory, which this thesis labels the “Baloch Theory,” 
places the blame for the lack of Baloch integration on the culture and capabilities 
of the Baloch people.  Their hierarchical, chief-centered culture, as well as 
capabilities gained through foreign influences has pushed them away from 
integration with Islamabad. This thesis evaluates both theories to ascertain which 
theory more accurately reflects the realities inherent in the Baloch-Islamabad 
problem. It finds that components of each theory significantly contribute to the 
problems.  In particular, the Sardari system, as described in the Baloch theory, 
presents tremendous obstacles for integration.  However, after evaluating each 
theory, this thesis concludes that the Islamabad theory most accurately explains 
the failure of the Baloch people to integrate into Pakistan.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
A little known insurgency in Southwest Asia is threatening to tear the 
nation of Pakistan apart.  The Baloch tribes, a grouping of 5 million about which 
Henry Kissinger said in 1962, “I wouldn’t know [this] problem if it hit me in the 
face”1 are gaining relevance in Pakistan, the region, and the world.  The 
separatist movement here has strategic impacts felt in Kabul, Delhi, and 
Washington. It has economic impacts felt in Tehran, Dubai, Beijing, and Central 
Asia.  It is impacting the daily lives of people all over Pakistan. Were the 
irredentist movement to achieve their goal of an independent Balochistan, calls 
for separate homelands for Pakistan’s other movements would amplify.2 The 
result would be a government in Islamabad with even less control than they have 
today.  Most experts agree that the existence of Pakistan could be jeopardized.3  
This would forever change the economic, political, and strategic landscape of 
South and Southwest Asia. 
The insurgency is just one of the problems that Islamabad has among 
these people.  Social unrest, illiteracy, and economic underdevelopment add to 
this ongoing crisis.  Furthermore, international pressure from India, Iran, China, 
Afghanistan, and Central Asia complicates Pakistan’s choices.  These countries 
have strategic energy and economic interests tied up in Balochistan by means of 
pipelines, ports, and roads.  With so much on the line with the Baloch, why has 
the government of Pakistan been thus far unable to quell insurgent violence, 
address grievances, and bring the people into the mainstream?  It cannot be for 
                                            
1 Selig S. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry," International Security, 
Winter 1980–81: 152–163, 152. 
2 The “nations” of Sindh, Gilgit Baltistan, and Balochistan are members of Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).  They live (at least partially) within the borders of 
Pakistan.  Furthermore, many have also called for a separate homeland for Pashtuns. 
3 Waheed Khan, "Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan," Time Magazine, November 
1, 2009; and Nicholas Schmidle, To Live or To Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in 
Pakistan (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2009), 74. 
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a lack of tools.  The government has a vast array of resources at its disposal.  To 
put down an insurgency, it has a highly capable army, well-equipped police force, 
and an extensive network of paramilitary forces.  To address economic 
grievances, it receives billions of dollars in foreign aid and investment each year 
and has a growing economy.4  To address political problems, it has a functioning, 
democratically elected central government.  Furthermore, should not the 
common bonds of Islam form religious linkages between the Baloch and the 
home for South Asia’s Muslims, Pakistan?  Yet, despite over sixty years of 
attempts, the government of Pakistan has been unable to achieve the integration 
of the Baloch into the mainstream. 
This puzzle has received the attention of politicians, scholars, and military 
leaders for decades. However, there is no universal understanding of the 
problem among the Baloch, much less a clear solution.  Instead, two competing 
theories emerge.  The first theory, labeled here the “Islamabad theory,”5 reflects 
the viewpoints of many outside of Pakistan.  Under the Islamabad theory, the 
Baloch problems can be explained by looking at strategies undertaken by the 
central government.  These policies, according to the theory, have pushed the 
Baloch even further away from national integration.  Supporters of the Islamabad 
theory say that the Baloch have been politically abused, economically exploited, 
and have been on the receiving end of excessive military force.  The second 
theory, labeled here the “Baloch theory,” emphasizes the challenging human 
geography of the Baloch.  The Pakistani government, press, and academia tend 
to lean on this as the principal explanation of the Baloch problem.  The Baloch 
theory argues that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch has made national 
integration especially difficult.  In particular, the Baloch theory places the blame 
                                            
4 Pakistan Times, "Pakistan Economy on Positive Growth for Last One Year," Pakistan 
Times, January 21, 2010. 
5 From 1947 to 1960, Karachi was the capital of Pakistan.  However, for the sake of 
simplicity, the name “Islamabad” is synonymous with the central government of Pakistan, 
regardless of the actual location of the national capital during the time period under consideration.  
Thus, actions taken by the government prior to the establishment of Islamabad as a capital will 
still be included in this term.   
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at the feet of the Baloch chiefs, the Sardars, and their tribal system.  Additionally, 
the theory looks to the capabilities that the Baloch gain through foreign influences 
as a likely source of the Baloch-Islamabad problems. Those favoring the Baloch 
theory pay little heed to the strategies of Islamabad.  Likewise, those critical of 
Islamabad’s strategies do not give much weight to the Baloch theory.  Objective 
analysis that balances and evaluates both conditions and strategies does not 
exist.  As a result, readers are left with an incomplete picture of the problem, as 
well as possible solutions, for the Baloch and Islamabad. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The presence of two competing theories influencing contemporary work 
on the Baloch demands their analysis.  Unfortunately, a systematic analysis of 
both the Baloch and Islamabad theories does not exist.  This thesis intends to 
meet that need and determine which theory more accurately reflects the situation 
between Pakistan and the Baloch. For the Islamabad theory, which this thesis 
addresses first, numerous questions arise. How have the policies of Islamabad 
with respect to the Baloch succeeded or failed?  Are there times in which policies 
brought integration closer to reality?  How have government policies pushed the 
province away from the mainstream? For the Baloch theory, we consider a 
different set of questions. How have conditions affected the problem among the 
Baloch?  How have cultural, political, and international factors influenced 
integration into Pakistan? 
C.  RELEVANCE 
Today, as never before, the world has its eyes on Pakistan.  From 
President Obama’s Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy in South Asia to the continuing 
threat of nuclear war with India, many observe it with tremendous concern.  But, 
this focus on Pakistan has not been a result of problems among the Baloch.  The 
focus of international concern has been on the Islamist violence originating in 
Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered  
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Tribal Areas (FATA).  In many ways, the international community is much like 
Kissinger in 1962.  This, after all, is Pakistan’s “other problem.”6  So then, why 
study this little known “problem”? 
The successful integration of the Baloch into the nation of Pakistan is 
timely and relevant. Domestic, regional, and international factors weigh heavily 
on this issue.  Domestically, the territory occupied by the Baloch, mostly southern 
Balochistan province, represents for Pakistan a possible way out of their current 
economic downturn.  Through utilizing the abundant natural resources, 
establishing international pipelines, and completing the construction and 
utilization of Gwadar seaport, the Baloch territory is a potential economic boon to 
Pakistan.  Without stability in this war-torn region, however, Pakistan cannot 
possibly succeed at even one of these ambitious projects.  Furthermore, a 
successful separatist movement among the Baloch would threaten the existence 
of the Pakistani state.  It would inspire existing movements among the Sindhi, 
Gilgit, and Pashtun peoples and could result in the disintegration of Pakistan.  
Regionally, Balochistan has tremendous economic and strategic importance.  
Currently two international energy pipelines are designed to transit Baloch 
territory.  The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, also called the “pipeline for 
peace”7 is closest to construction.  The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
(TAPI) pipeline is also coming closer to reality.  If the Baloch are not integrated 
into the national scene, these international pipelines would become prime targets 
for rebels who are well experienced at pipeline destruction.8   
Regional neighbors, to include the United States and her allies in 
Afghanistan, can also see the importance of the Baloch for the control of the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda.  These international terrorist groups house their 
                                            
6 Waheed Khan, “Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan.”  
7 George Perkovich and Revati Prasad, “A Pipeline to Peace,” New York Times, April 18, 
2005. 
8 As will be demonstrated in Chapter III, the Baloch separatists’ primary method of achieving 
national attention is through the explosion of natural gas pipelines bound for major urban areas.  
Pipeline destruction is relatively easy, results in few casualties, if any, and yet affects thousands 
of Pakistanis. 
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leadership in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan.9  Many of the attacks 
on NATO forces in Afghanistan originate from Balochistan province.10  Since the 
Baloch are firmly against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, they could be utilized as an 
ally to fight against them.11  Furthermore, if the Pakistani Army is successful at 
pushing Islamists out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the 
Islamists may try to seek refuge in Baloch tribal areas.  This only increases the 
importance of solving the Baloch issue.  There is also ample evidence of opium 
and weapons smuggling through Baloch-controlled territories. 
The Baloch represent a potential tipping point for the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan.  This is the only majority Muslim state with nuclear weapons.  This is 
also a nation on relatively friendly terms with the United States and the European 
Union.  The demise of Pakistan would create problems worldwide.  Additionally, 
the situation among the Baloch highlights how nations deal with separatist 
movements within their borders.  Separatist movements are present worldwide 
and affect large and small states as well as developed and undeveloped nations.  
A study of the Baloch of Pakistan offers insight into how nations respond to the 
conditions in un-integrated lands and employ strategies of integration. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The challenge in this thesis is to link the individual factors present in 
conditions and strategies to the actual problems and potential solutions for the 
Baloch.  For the Islamabad theory, this thesis must look at linkages between the 
strategies of Islamabad and the integration of the Pakistani Baloch.  It must 
discuss how political policies have affected integration over the last sixty years.  
This thesis must evaluate the connection between economic underdevelopment 
and exploitation to the problems in the province.  This thesis must deal with the 
                                            
9  Schmidle, To Live or To Perish Forever, 75.  
10  Frederic Grare, "E-mail Conversation with Gregory Pipes" (Monterey, CA,  December 5, 
2008). 
11  Frederic Grare, "Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism," Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2006, 4. 
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issue of military actions against the Baloch.  It must determine if military actions 
improve of devolve the integration of the Baloch.   Finally, this thesis must 
evaluate the claims of the Islamabad theory by pitting government policies 
against insurgent activities. 
For the Baloch theory, this thesis must first evaluate the claim that Baloch 
culture affects this problem.  It must observe the hierarchical nature of the Baloch 
tribes and determine how this structure relates to their resistance to join 
Pakistan.  Second, this thesis must consider the contentious issue of foreign 
involvement among the Baloch.  It must discuss the likelihood that foreign 
governments such as India and Afghanistan are physically, financially, or 
logistically providing aid to separatist movements in Balochistan.  It must also 
analyze how a political involvement, mostly in the form of drug trafficking, affects 
the integration of the Baloch.  Finally, this thesis must evaluate the reactions of 
other peripheral ethnic groups to Islamabad’s policies.  For this task, this thesis 
compares the Baloch to the Bengalis of East Pakistan. 
After addressing these challenges, this thesis argues that the Baloch 
theory holds certain validities, especially regarding the relationship of the Sardari 
system to integration.  However, the final analysis illustrates that the principle 
reason for the Baloch-Islamabad tensions, and their failure to integrate into 
Pakistani life, is best explained with the Islamabad theory.  The Islamabad theory 
best predicts the interaction between the Baloch insurgency and the 
government’s policies.  As Islamabad addresses grievances, the insurgency 
becomes pacified.  Likewise, exacerbation of grievances by the center intensifies 
insurgent activities. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on the issues surrounding Balochistan is sparse, often outdated, 
and often fraught with pro-Islamabad or pro-separatist biases.   Furthermore, no 
author attempts to systematically analyze both conditions among the Baloch and 
Pakistani policies pertaining to integration.  It is this gap in the literature that this 
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thesis strives to fill.  Along individual subjects relevant to the Baloch issue, a 
decent population of scholarly and media literature exists.   
The central question regarding the Baloch integration is the nature of the 
Baloch insurgency.  Labeled “miscreants” by some, “nationalists” and “freedom 
fighters” by others, these are the ethnic Baloch who have taken up arms against 
the central government of Pakistan.  They have done so four times in history.  
Explanations for the causes of these insurgencies are not uniform.  Instead, we 
see a divide in analysis.  Pro-government literature focuses on the causes 
stemming from the Baloch people while other work focuses on the actions of the 
Pakistani government.  Abid Husain Shah, for example, lists five causes for the 
1973 insurgency.  These were Baloch demands for a separate state, the 
influence of the tribal system, economic causes unjustly inflated by the Sardars, 
the tribal chiefs, and the influence of foreign governments.12  He completely 
neglects to list the refusal of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to grant 
Balochistan full provincial rights and his dismissal of the Balochistan assembly.13  
Selig Harrison cites this as the spark that set off the insurgency.  On the other 
side, Tarique Niazi argues that there is a direct link between the state of 
Pakistan’s policies and the rise of insurgencies.14  He demonstrates this through 
each of the four insurgencies.  However, unlike Shah, Niazi does not heed the 
role that  the conditions on the ground played in each of these insurgencies.  
Others follow suit by neglecting to address or dismissing the environmental 
factors on the Baloch insurgencies.  Frederic Graré’s listed reasons for the 2002 
resurgence of Baloch nationalism stand in contrast to Shah’s.  He cites 
expropriation, marginalization, and dispossession at the hands of the central 
government upon the Baloch people.15 Selig Harrison, perhaps the most 
                                            
12  Abid Hussain Shah, The Volatile Situation of Balochistan - Options to Bring it into 
Streamline (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School (Master's Thesis), 2007), 34. 
13 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34.  
14 Tarique Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism; The Case of Baluchistan 
(Pakistan),” International Journal of Contemporary Sociology 42, no. 2 (2005): 267–293, 272. 
15 Grare, "Pakistan,” 5–6.  
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respected scholar on the Baloch, has written extensively on the Baloch, their 
culture, and their strategic setting.  However, in works ranging from 1981 to 
2009, he sees their nationalism rooted in their culture but sees the insurgencies 
rooted in Pakistani government actions.  So, we see a divide between scholars.  
Some reference the conditions on the ground, the Baloch, as causing the 
insurgent uprisings.  Others do not link conditions to the violence.  Few 
analytically consider that conditions of culture and capabilities could contribute to 
the violence.  They point their fingers to Islamabad and her strategies. 
1. The Islamabad Theory 
Islamabad’s strategies towards integration of the Baloch revolve around 
three themes.  These are politics, military operations, and economic 
development.    For politics, most analysts note that the central government has 
not afforded the Baloch full democratic rights.  Few, however, link this political 
strategy with integration of the people.  One notable exception is Tarique Niazi, 
who links the denial of democracy to insurgent violence.  Specifically, Niazi 
notes, “Since Pakistan’s independence, insurgent violence in Baluchistan broke 
out in response to the state’s attempt at suppressing the democratic will of the 
people…”16 Another exception is Selig Harrison’s work on the Baloch people.  He 
also notes this connection between denials of democracy and violence.17 
Frederic Graré discusses how elections in the last decade retained this pattern of 
denying full democratic rights to the Baloch.18    
The topic of appropriate use of military force nets different perspectives.    
Many make note of excessive violence against civilians, women and children, 
and property.  Expectedly, most analysts outside of Pakistan see military action 
against the Baloch as generally excessive. They argue that the Pakistani 
government has been heavy-handed in its attempts to forcibly integrate the 
                                            
16 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 272.  
17 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 25.  
18 Grare, "Pakistan,” 11.  
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Baloch into the nation.  A prime example is the 1974 Chamalang attack.  In this 
operation, at the height of the third Baloch insurgency, the Army attacked a 
massing of Baloch women, children, and livestock in order to draw out the hiding 
Baloch guerillas. Harrison links the military activity at Chamalang in 1974 with 
current bitterness amongst Baloch.19  A. B. Awan states, “the Chamalang 
operation inflicted permanent scars of hatred and mistrust.”20  Yet, as Tarique 
Niazi points out, the Chamalang operation, brutal though it was, helped the 
government defeat the insurgency.21  On this point, Shah agrees with Niazi.  
While not mentioning Chamalang by name nor making mention of the attacks on 
unarmed families, he describes Chamalang as a “turning point” in the third 
insurgency that caused the Baloch to change their approach.22  Chamalang also 
“left no doubt in the minds of miscreants about the resolve of the army to 
establish the writ of the law.”23  Another key example of the accusation of 
excessive force is the mass disappearances of Baloch in the last few years.  Irfan 
Hussain argues that the military force exercised in these disappearances is 
excessive and only serves to increase the ranks of the separatists.24  Most link 
these disappearances with President Musharraf, but others say that President 
Zardari has continued this tactic. 
Economic development for the Baloch is a crossroads between the 
sovereignty of the Pakistani state and the property of the Baloch.  Robert G. 
Wirsing calls the expropriation of natural resources as the most persistent 
grievance of the Baloch.25  Niazi asserts that this usage of Baloch natural 
                                            
19 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 38.  
20 A.B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Processes (London: New Century 
Publishers, 1985), 313. 
21 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 282.  
22 Shah, “The Volatile Situation in Balochistan,” 39.  
23 Ibid., 41.  
24 Irfan Husain, "'Disappearances' Without a Trace," Dawn, December 23, 2006. 
25 Robert G. Wirsing, Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The 
Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2008), 4. 
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resources by the Pakistani government is “at the core of the continuing 
violence.”26  However, others see the issue of economics differently.  They see it 
as a tool used by the tribal chiefs to retain their power27 and deprive their 
citizens.28   
2. The Baloch Theory 
Conditions present among the Baloch people center around two crucial 
areas.  These are the culture of the Baloch tribes and their enhanced, foreign-
sourced capabilities.    
Regarding the culture of the Baloch tribes, the critical element discussed 
in literature is the hierarchical nature of their tribal organization.  However, few 
outside of Pakistan link this cultural with the problem of Balochistan’s integration. 
Shah argues that the tribal organization of the Baloch is a great contributor to the 
current problems in Balochistan.  It contributes to the “deplorable political 
landscape that has given rise to certain complex crises in the region.”29   Zaresh 
Khan places the blame for the Baloch grievances squarely on the shoulders of 
the tribal chiefs.  He states, “upheavals and tranquility in Balochistan have largely 
been dependent upon the caprice and whims of self-centered Baloch chieftains 
and feudal lords.”30  Justin Dunne cites the relevance of the Baloch chiefs to their 
political problems, as well as tacking on the cultural divide between Baloch and 
Pubjabis to the political landscape of Balochistan.31  Outside of Pakistan, though, 
cultural discussions are largely anthropological in nature and do not link culture 
to Balochistan’s problems.  Paul Titus, Selig Harrison, and T. Hungerford Holdich 
all explain that the Baloch leadership system and tribal culture differ from the 
                                            
26 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 286.  
27 Zaresh Khan, “Inside Balochistan Crises,” PakTribune, May 14, 2009;  and Shah, “The 
Volatile Situation in Balochistan,” 23.  
28  Zaresh Khan, “Inside Balochistan Crises.”  
29 Shah, "The Volatile Situation in Balochistan,” 23.  
30 Zaresh Khan, "Inside Balochistan Crises."   
31  Justin S. Dunne, "Crisis in Balochistan: A Historical Analysis of the Baluch Nationalist 
Movement in Pakistan," Naval Postgraduate School (2006), 65–66. 
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Pashtun.32  Awan, Harrison, and Graré, have explained that the Baloch are not 
Islamic fundamentalists.33  Graré emphasizes that they are not to be lumped in 
with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, despite the government’s efforts to do so.34  Louis 
Buffardi, Graré, and Harrison have shown how the Baloch have utilized alliances, 
to include Marxism, to bolster their position against the government of 
Pakistan.35  However, they do not link the cultural conditions of the Baloch to 
their resistance to Pakistan’s writ. 
As for international involvement in the Baloch separatist movements, 
nearly all literature comes out of Pakistan.  Qaiser Janjua highlights the possible 
role of India in Balochistan, arguing that for economic and political reasons India 
is interested in a destabilized Balochistan.36  He also argues that Afghanistan 
has been a consistent supporter of Baloch nationalism.37   This drumbeat of 
international aid to Baloch separatists is echoed in the Pakistani press.  Mariana 
Babaar wrote in 2006 that India is “fomenting trouble in Pakistan via 
Afghanistan.”38  When Christine Fair anecdotally confirmed Indian involvement in 
Iranian Balochistan, citing both financial and logistical support to separatists,39 
the Pakistani press wrote extensively on this revelation.  An editorial in the 
                                            
32 Paul Titus, "Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pashtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization, and 
History in Western Pakistan," Modern Asian Studies, July 1998: 657-687; Harrison, In 
Afghanistan's Shadow, 10; and T. Hundergford Holdich, The Indian Borderland:1880–1900 
(London, 1909). 
33 Grare, "Pakistan,” 11; Awan, Baluchistan, 149; and Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 8.  
34 Grare, "Pakistan,” 11. 
35 Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, no. 32 (Autumn 1978): 136–
160; Louis Nicholas Buffardi, Soviet Strategy in South Asia 1953-1977. Focus: Balochistan (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1981); and Grare, "Pakistan,” 11.  
36 Qaiser Janjua, "In the Shadow of the Durand Line: Security, Stability, and the Future of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan," Master's Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 
2009), 54. 
37 Janjua, "In the Shadow of the Durand Line,” 51.  
38 Mariana Baabar, "How India is Fomenting Trouble in Pakistan via Afghanistan," The News, 
April 15, 2006. 
39 Stephen P Cohen, C. Christine Fair, Sumit Ganguly, Shaun Gregory, Aqil Shah and 
Ashley J. Tellis, "What's the Problem with Pakistan?," Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2009, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan 
(accessed January 20, 2010). 
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Pakistani Daily Times asserted that Fair’s statement “has put an end to the yes-
or-no debate about India’s interference inside Pakistan and its use of a ‘facilitator’ 
Afghanistan government for doing so.”40   Politicians, naturally, join in this 
argument.  In 2004, the Balochistan Chief Minister, Jam Mohammad Yusuf,41 
accused India of operating camps for their Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) 
inside Balochistan.42  Outside of Pakistan, though, the rhetoric changes on the 
subject of international involvement with the Baloch.  Graré acknowledges the 
Pakistani accusations of Indian influence in Balochistan but dismisses its 
relevance.43 Waheed Khan likewise acknowledges the accusations of Indian 
influence in Balochistan.  Yet, he also dismisses it for lack of evidence.44 
A review of historical and contemporary literature on the Baloch-
Islamabad tensions reveals a consistent divide in analyses.   Many authors focus 
on the policies of Islamabad as the causal mechanism for these problems.  
Others instead look to the conditions of culture and capabilities as the primary 
explanation of Baloch-Islamabad tensions.  Few look at both conditions and 
policies.  This thesis fills this gap by addressing and evaluating each theory. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis systematically analyzes and evaluates both the Islamabad and 
Baloch theories. It evaluates the conditions on the ground among the Baloch 
people, seeing how their culture and foreign-gained capabilities have shaped the 
problems the Baloch have with the central Pakistani government.  It examines a 
comparison of the Baloch behaviors to those of the Bengalis of East Pakistan.  It 
also examines the impact of Pakistani strategies towards solving the Baloch 
                                            
40 Daily Times, "Editorial: India and Balochistan," The Daily Times, April 7, 2009. 
41 While the chief minister of Balochistan from 2002-2007 and an ethnic Baloch, he is a 
member of the Pakistani Muslim League (Q), at the time aligned with Musharraf, and not a Baloch 
nationalist. 
42 Dawn, "'RAW Camps in Balochistan,' Dawn, August 31, 2004. 
43 Grare, "Pakistan,” 9–10.  
44 Waheed Khan, "Pakistan's Other Problem Area: Baluchistan.”  
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problem.  This thesis evaluates the impacts of Islamabad’s political, economic, 
and military policies.  It also examines the correlation between Islamabad’s 
policies and insurgent activities. 
In order to analyze these theories, this thesis relies on a wide variety of 
sources.  First, are anthropological works on the Baloch people.  This helps to 
understand the conditions of culture in Balochistan.  Second, are historical works 
of the previous four Baloch insurgencies against the Pakistani government.  
Third, are research products produced from think tanks across the globe that 
analyze the current uprising.  One of these that proves valuable in understanding 
the insurgency is the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).  The SATP provides a 
database of insurgent attacks in Balochistan.  This data is helpful for establishing 
trends of insurgent attacks.  Finally, this thesis considers the contemporary 
media, both for statements from officials and for more recent analysis.   
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with a historical overview of the relationship between 
Islamabad and the Baloch.  It then has two chapters that address the theories in 
order. The first section deals with the Islamabad theory.  The second section 
addresses the Baloch theory.  A final chapter summarizes findings and makes 
policy recommendations.  
 14
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 15
II. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN 
ISLAMABAD AND THE BALOCH PEOPLE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are ample resources that document the physical and human 
geography, as well as millennia of historical background on the Baloch.  Many, 
such as Dunne and Awan, have labored to explain the Baloch conditions under 
the British.  Others have dug even further, highlighting the Baloch resistance to 
authority from ancient times.  Rather than rehash what has already been well 
documented, this section gives a historical perspective on the relationship of the 
Baloch with the Pakistani government from 1947 to 2009.  In so doing, this 
section gives the reader a basis of understanding of what the government of 
Pakistan has tried to accomplish with the Baloch over the past sixty years.  It 
supports the initial claim of this thesis that the Baloch have never integrated into 
the national picture of Pakistan.  In order to demonstrate this situation, this 
section highlights the four Baloch insurgencies, as well as the significant efforts 
of the government to integrate the province.  Figure 1 shows an ethnicity-based 
map of Pakistan.  The Baloch people live predominantly in the tri-border region of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. 
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Figure 1.   Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan (source: 
http://oook.info/afghan/Pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg) 
B. ACCESSION INTO PAKISTAN—THE FIRST BALOCH INSURGENCY 
As it became evident that British India would divide into the two states of 
India and Pakistan, the Baloch-populated states lobbied the British for 
independence.  This request denied, they declared independence on August 15, 
1947.  This was one day after Pakistan gained their independence.  This 
declaration was supported by the fact that since 1876 Kalat, the largest and most 
influential Baloch state, had been an autonomous state under the British Raj.45  
The Khan of Kalat offered to Pakistan a special relationship of autonomy in which 
Pakistan would maintain authority on defense, foreign policy, and 
communications.46  In addition to the Khan, the Kalat Assembly voted in favor of  
 
                                            
45 Ahmad Yar Khan, Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar 
Baigi (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 111. 
46 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 273.  
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independence.  Symbolizing the willingness of the Baloch to work with, but not 
under Pakistan, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, a member of the Kalat Assembly, 
said the following: 
If Pakistan wants to treat us as a sovereign people we are ready to 
extend our friendship. But if Pakistan does not do so and forces us 
to accept this fate, flying in the face of democratic principle, every 
Baluch will fight for freedom.47   
In March 1948, despite these democratic attempts for autonomy, the 
Pakistani government utilized military force to coerce the Khan of Kalat to pledge 
allegiance to Pakistan.  In resistance to this, the prince of Kalat took up arms 
against the Pakistani government.  He established his resistance from 
Afghanistan with a humble force of 700 tribesmen.  In late 1948, this uprising was 
brought under control by the central government.48    
C. THE RESPONSE TO ONE UNIT—THE SECOND INSURGENCY 
The second Baloch insurgency was in direct response to the One Unit 
scheme.  One Unit was the 1955 reorganization of Pakistan’s provinces into two 
provinces—East and West Pakistan.  It was largely a response to the growing 
political power of the numerically dominant Bengalis in East Pakistan.  In order to 
prevent Bengali domination, general and later president Ayub Khan combined 
the provinces and tribal areas of West Pakistan into one province.  While the 
most apparent justification for One Unit was to marginalize the electoral power of 
the Bengalis, this scheme marginalized Baloch as well.  Perhaps a secondary 
motivation was, as Niazi asserts, to prevent those on the periphery of the 
government from dominating the elites.49  In theory, the Baloch, Pashtuns, 
Sindhis, and Bengalis could not ally themselves together and overpower the 
ruling Punjabis and the India-born Muhajirs.  Within the time period of One Unit, 
the government continued its marginalization of the Baloch.  For example, during 
                                            
47 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 25.  
48 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 274. 
49 Ibid., 275. 
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the fifteen-year span of One Unit, Balochistan had nine chief commissioners.  
None of these commissioners were Baloch.50  The response of the Baloch was 
initially nonviolent.  The prince of Kalat formed a Balochi Peoples Party with the 
intention of ending One Unit.  The Khan of Kalat mobilized the tribal chiefs, the 
Sardars, against One Unit.  However, before any violent insurgency was initiated, 
the Army arrested the Khan on October 6, 1958.  The Army also attacked those 
who protested against the government.  This ultimately led to Ayub Khan 
declaring martial law the next day.51  While intended to prevent violence, the 
arresting of the Khan had the opposite effect.  Violence spread throughout the 
Balochistan areas.  The government deployed tanks, artillery, and many troops 
into the region.  In the mid 1960s, this insurgency had a spike of violence that 
was so large that some label it as a separate insurgency.  It occurred after the 
government forcibly removed the title of Sardar from several tribal chiefs.  In 
1970, Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya Khan ended One Unit, established 
the province of Balochistan, and announced upcoming elections.  Immediately 
the violence stopped. 
D. BANGLADESH’S SHADOW—THE THIRD BALOCH INSURGENCY 
Following the disastrous defeat of the Pakistani military in the 1971 Civil 
War, the government approved a new constitution.  For the Baloch, this was a 
highly successful and optimistic time.  They achieved their goal of the dissolution 
of One Unit and the central government was in a weakened position following the 
war.  Thus, the newly elected Baloch politicians were under considerable internal 
pressure to push Islamabad for greater Baloch autonomy.52  This was partly a 
success as the 1973 national constitution reduced the role of the central 
government in the provinces.  However, as Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto began to 
see the Balochistan assembly pushing away from Islamabad,53 he dismissed the 
                                            
50 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 275. 
51 Ibid., 276. 
52 Ibid., 280. 
53 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34.  
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provincial assembly.  The immediate response from the Baloch was war.  As 
Baloch insurgents began to ambush Army convoys, Bhutto allied with the Shah 
of Iran.54  What followed was the largest war in Balochistan, a civil war that 
largely went unnoticed by the outside world.55  In this war, 55,000 Baloch fought 
against the 80,000 deployed Pakistani soldiers, as well as Iranian helicopter 
gunships.56  It was in this insurgency that the Chamalang incident occurred.  As 
previously discussed, this operation significantly altered the tactics of the 
insurgency, causing it to simmer to a low level until Bhutto’s arrest in the 1977 
coup.  Bhutto’s arrest and General Zia’s favorable treatment of the Baloch ended 
the third insurgency. 
E. THE FOURTH INSURGENCY—RESOURCES AND THE MILITARY 
In 2002, the initiation of the Gwadar development project touched off a 
fourth insurgency in the Pakistani province of Balochistan.57  Gwadar, a once 
sleepy fishing village close to the Iranian border, was infused with millions of 
dollars of foreign and domestic investment.  The goal was to transform it into a 
major hub port designed to rival Dubai.  While initial promises from the 
government spoke of local inclusion in the benefits of this project,58 the 
perception among the Baloch was different.  They sensed this to be yet another 
example of expropriation of their resources for the benefit of the central 
government.  From 2002–2009, this rate of insurgent attacks skyrocketed.  In 
2002, there was an average of one attack every four months.  In 2008, the height 
                                            
54 Niazi, “Democracy, Development and Terrorism,” 280. 
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of the insurgency, there were over 33 attacks per month.59  The military under 
President General Pervez Musharraf did not stand idly by.  At a conference of 
corps commanders in 2006, Musharraf defiantly emphasized that, “the writ of the 
Pakistani government will never be challenged.  Let that be a warning… if 
anyone challenges the writ of the government, I will crush it.”60  The causes for 
this insurgency, which continues today, are generally seen by the Baloch to be 
democracy, military excesses, and economic exploitation. The government, 
however, places the blame at the feet of the Sardars and foreign governments, 
namely India and Afghanistan. 
F. ATTEMPTS AT INTEGRATION 
In attempts to integrate the province into Pakistan, the central government 
has taken different strategies throughout history.  Pakistan’s first policy was a 
“closed-border” policy that did little to help the Baloch people.61 It did, however, 
seem to uphold the Baloch’s traditional sense of autonomy.  However, under 
Bhutto’s tenure as prime minister, the government instead adopted a “forward 
policy” that emphasized the need for development and integration of the 
province.62  This attempt to integrate the province by the writ of the government 
set the conditions for the third insurgency.  Following Bhutto’s arrest, the new 
dictator, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, significantly pacified the Baloch.  He 
released an estimated 6,000 prisoners of the third insurgency.  Furthermore, he 
declared amnesty for any remaining insurgents, to include those in hiding in 
Afghanistan.63  While Zia’s acts of reconciliation quelled the insurgency, he did 
                                            
59 Data on the rate of attack in Balochistan during the fourth insurgency comes from the 
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little more to address the problems among the Baloch.64  From the start of Zia’s 
reign until 2002, Baloch problems were small and, consequently, ignored by the 
central government.  It was only after the start of the fourth insurgency that the 
government began taking further steps to attempt integration.  The most significant 
step taken since 2002 was the creation of the Senate Committee on Balochistan.   In 
2004, the Prime Minister ordered the establishment of this committee and charged it 
with the task of responding to the challenges in Balochistan.  The government 
addressed not only the law and order situation but also the political demands of the 
Baloch.  The result was a report that recommended significant changes in the 
government’s military, political, economic, and energy policies regarding the 
Baloch.65  The response from the Baloch was profound.  As Chapter II 
demonstrates, the committee’s report coincided with a 70 percent drop in insurgent 
violence from the previous three months.   Since Musharraf’s resignation in 2008, 
the new Pakistani President, Asif Ali Zardari, himself of Baloch descent, has reached 
out to solve the Baloch issue.  He initiated the “Balochistan Package,” a combination 
of measures aimed at addressing the languishing demands of the Baloch and 
integrating them into the nation.66 
G. CONCLUSION  
The Baloch people have yet to be integrated into the Pakistani 
mainstream.  Despite numerous efforts undertaken by the government, they 
remain outside of the government’s writ and continue to voice their displeasure 
with the actions of Islamabad.  With this historical understanding in hand, this 
thesis now turns to the two competing theories.  Which one better explains the 
sources of the Baloch-Islamabad tensions?  Which provides a better pathway to 
integration and reconciliation? 
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III. THE ISLAMABAD THEORY 
The Islamabad theory posits that the actions of the central government of 
Pakistan have been the key factor that has stood in the way of Baloch integration 
to Pakistan. Advocates of this theory argue that the government of Pakistan is to 
blame for the lack of integration among the Baloch.  The Islamabad theory’s 
three components include political oppression, military excess, and economic 
expropriation.  This chapter evaluates these components and then examines 
correlative data between insurgent attacks and Islamabad’s policies.   
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Islamabad theory advocates that the principle explanation of the 
persistent tensions between the Baloch and Islamabad can be found when we 
examine the policies of Islamabad toward the Baloch.   
This chapter first evaluates the components of the Islamabad theory.  
Specifically, it looks at its key components of political and economic deprivation, 
as well as excessive use of military force.  It then further analyzes the Islamabad 
theory by overlaying Islamabad’s strategies with monthly levels of insurgent 
attacks. This chapter examines insurgent attack levels throughout the fourth 
insurgency.  It then compares these attack levels to Islamabad’s implementation 
of Baloch-oriented policies and strategies.  By doing this comparison, this 
evaluation holds the recipient, the Baloch, constant and vary the policies of 
Islamabad.  If the Islamabad theory is an accurate explanation for the Baloch-
Islamabad tensions, we should see that the reactions of the Baloch vary with the 
changing policies of Islamabad.  Some policies should cause integration while 
others should push the Baloch away. 
B. POLITICAL DEPRIVATION 
The political component to the Islamabad theory is that the central 
government of Pakistan has regularly denied democracy to the Baloch.  As a 
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result of this, the government has diminished their ability to integrate this people 
group. For the Baloch, democracy denied appears in the forced Baloch 
incorporation into Pakistan, the One Unit scheme, the 1973–77 uprising, and the 
2002 elections.  As previously stated, Niazi asserts that these events directly 
caused each of the four Baloch uprisings.   
Proponents of the Islamabad theory point to the four insurgencies as the 
times when the Baloch were denied democracy.  An analysis of these events 
reveals that Islamabad was largely out of step with democratic principles when 
executing policies towards the Baloch.  As previously stated, the Khan of Kalat, 
the chief of the princely states that today makeup Balochistan, declared 
independence on August 15, 1947.  In addition to the Khan, the Kalat Assembly 
voted in favor of independence. In March 1948, despite these democratic 
attempts for autonomy, the Pakistani government utilized military force to coerce 
the Khan of Kalat to pledge allegiance to Pakistan.   The One Unit scheme is an 
additional example of democracy denied to the Baloch.  It is linked to the second 
insurgency.  Within Baloch politics during One Unit, the government continued its 
marginalization of the Baloch.  As the Baloch began to rebel, the Army arrested 
the Khan on October 6, 1958.  The Army also attacked those who protested 
against the government.  This ultimately led to Ayub Khan declaring martial law 
the next day.67  In 1970, Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya Khan ended 
One Unit, established the province of Balochistan, and announced upcoming 
elections.  Immediately the violence stopped.  It is possible that this point in 
Baloch history is most important for the government of Pakistan to understand.  
When democratic rights increased, insurgent violence ceased.  When autonomy 
was pledged, the tide of nationalism ebbed.  Following successful elections in 
1971, the newly elected Baloch politicians began to push away from 
Islamabad.68  In response, Bhutto promptly dismissed the assembly.  This incited 
the third insurgency.  Pakistan proved once again that the policy of restricting 
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democracy yielded the fruit of ever increasing violence.  The final example of the 
government of Pakistan’s denial of democracy to the Baloch came in 2002.  At 
the time, the beleaguered President General Pervez Musharraf was trying to 
legitimate his office.  To do so, he sought provincial governments whom he could 
manipulate, particularly in Balochistan.69  He sought a coalition with the Mutahida 
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an Islamic political party made up of several 
fundamentalist Islamic groups.  Groups tied to the government worked to 
manipulate the vote in Balochistan, resulting in a provincial win for the MMA.70  
This victory, exacted at the expense of Baloch democracy, helped to legitimize 
Musharraf’s rule.  This enabled Musharraf to advance an agenda of exploitation 
on Balochistan without political resistance from the provincial assembly.71  
Without a voice, the Baloch resorted again to an insurgency.  This insurgency 
persists today.  An analysis of peace in Balochistan yields the conclusion that the 
central government should have learned in 1970.  Expanding democratic rights 
and autonomy in Balochistan yields peace and an increase in the government’s 
ability to maintain their writ in the land.  There was no simpler way for the 
government to diminish their writ than to deny democracy to the Baloch. Thus, 
we see that, like with the Bengalis, the political component to the Islamabad 
theory reflects the reality of the Baloch integration.   
The next section of the Islamabad theory examines the argument that, in 
addition to political policies, Islamabad’s economic policies likewise hampered 
the integration of the Baloch. 
C. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION 
This component of the Islamabad theory argues that the government of 
Pakistan has economically exploited the Baloch.  In doing so, they have 
decreased the ability of the Baloch tribes to integrate into the nation.  To evaluate 
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this aspect of the Islamabad theory, this section looks at how resource 
expropriation, biased financial policies, and the withholding of financial benefits 
affected integration. 
1. Expropriation of Resources 
The central government made policies to utilize the natural resources 
present in the provinces for the benefit of the central government.  In the Baloch 
territories, natural resources exist underground in the form of minerals and 
energy resources.  Harrison points to these energy resources as a key reason 
why so many have fought over Balochistan.72  The Sui gas field located in 
Balochistan was the largest natural gas field in Pakistan.73  The name Sui gas is 
synonymous with natural gas in Pakistan.  In total, the province of Balochistan 
provides the nation with between 36 and 45 percent of the national demand for 
natural gas.  Despite this, many districts in Balochistan are still without gas 
transmission facilities, to include areas immediately surrounding the Sui gas 
field.74  Only four of the twenty-six Balochistan districts receive natural gas.75  
They remain the most poor and economically backward province after the first 60 
years of Pakistani independence.  Under Musharraf, the military stepped up their 
presence in Balochistan, centering their operations and cantonments on 
resource-rich areas.76  Additionally, the Musharraf government took significant 
steps to expand oil drilling and other mineral exploration in the province.  This 
was without the consent of the Baloch.  The expropriation of natural resources is 
the most persistent grievance of the Baloch.77  
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It is clear that the expropriation of natural resources has been a policy of 
Islamabad that has negatively affected the integration of the Baloch into the 
national scene. 
2. Biased Financial Policies 
The biased financial policies of the government have been evident in 
Balochistan.  Here, the government undertook mega projects without the 
consent, counsel, or profit sharing of the Baloch.  In 2002, Musharraf received 
international attention as the critical ally of the United States in the Afghanistan 
War.  He utilized this attention to initiate the Gwadar project, a mega-project with 
intentions to establish a deep-water port that would rival the best ports in the 
world.  This port, in the middle of the Balochistan coast, was a cooperative 
project with China.  Lying near the rich resources of Balochistan, the port would 
transform the small Baloch town of Gwadar from a population of 5,000 to 
millions.78  Many Baloch feared this project would place them in the minority 
within their own territory.79  In response to this development project, Baloch 
insurgents launched multiple attacks on Gwadar and other key development 
projects.  This campaign gained international attention when two Chinese 
engineers working on the Gwadar project were assassinated in 2006.  The 
government of Pakistan ignored the concerns that the Baloch had over Gwadar.  
Once again in a position of not being heard, the Baloch resistance movement 
began to undermine the Pakistani writ in the region.80  So, the economic portion 
of the Islamabad theory continues to reflect the reality of the problems that 
Islamabad has had with the Baloch. 
3. Exclusion from National Benefits 
A final economic consideration is the exclusion of the Baloch from national 
benefits. As a percentage of GDP, Balochistan has not experienced a rise in their 
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share of the national income.  In fact, it has declined.  Between 1972–73 and 
1999–2000, Balochistan’s share of the GDP declined from 4.5 to 3.7 percent.81  
For natural gas, Balochistan received only 12.4 percent of its due royalties.  The 
further exploration and development of the region under Musharraf was executed 
without the consent of the Baloch,82 and likely without any intent of profit sharing.  
Consequently, the central government implemented policies in Balochistan that 
were intended to deprive the people of proper development.  The natural 
outcome of this was violent resistance. 
In evaluation of the economic aspect of the Islamabad theory, it is clear 
that the economic policies of Islamabad have hindered their national integration. 
D. MILITARY EXCESS 
A final component of the Islamabad theory that this chapter considers is 
the argument that excessive military force has pushed back integration.  The 
Pakistani government has traditionally utilized military force against the Baloch 
as a tool to maintain their writ over the people.  Has this worked?  Have 
excessive military actions—actions that targeted civilians or personal property—
affected the integration of these people groups to Islamabad? 
Many scholars have documented the excesses of the Pakistani military 
towards the Baloch.  The intentional targeting of civilians, the destruction of 
crops, the assassination of resistance leaders, and the kidnapping of dissidents 
has marred the image of a government trying to preserve unity.  
The military excess in Balochistan has been characterized by the targeting 
of the nationalist movement’s leadership.  However, this strategy has not served 
to crush the resistance, as Islamabad has wished.  Instead, it has served to only 
incite more resistance and thereby reduce the integration of the Baloch into 
Pakistan.  This targeting began early in the resistance.  During the second 
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insurgency, it was characterized by the actions of the military while arresting the 
Khan of Kalat.  The Army took ancestral valuables, detained supporters, and 
“roughed up” protesters.83  In response to the resistance that grew out of the 
Khan’s arrest, the Army bombed villages suspected of harboring insurgents.84  At 
other times, the Army responded to insurgency by burning the crops of Baloch 
leaders.85   The 1973–77 War was characterized harassing and resettling of 
civilians,86 killing of women and children,87 and Army brutality.88  Finally, the 
insurgency that began in 2002 has been marked with allegations of as many as 
thousands of Baloch kidnapped by the Army.89  The problem with using 
excessive military force in Balochistan was well articulated by columnist Irfan 
Hussain. 
By brutalizing the population, you only make new enemies. We 
should have learned this lesson from our army’s experience in East 
Pakistan in 1971. An unknown number of people, possibly 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were killed; women were 
raped; and villages torched in an attempt to cow down the Bengali 
people. But far from submitting, the Mukti Bahini recruited more 
volunteers to its cause.90 
This section has demonstrated that through the excessive use of military 
force, the Baloch are only less likely to integrate and the path towards 
reconciliation becomes strewn with obstacles.  Whether or not the Baloch 
interpretations of military excesses are factually accurate does not soften their  
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importance.  The Chamalang operation, the past treatment of the Khan, and the 
recent suspicious deaths of Baloch leaders pose tremendous hurdles to the 
process of national integration.  
E. POLICIES AND INSURGENT ACTIVITY 
A final stage in evaluating the Islamabad theory is a comparison of 
insurgent activity to Islamabad’s policies.  This is accomplished in three 
increments.  The first increment is to present the raw data on monthly insurgent 
attacks on government targets from the Baloch.  Second, this section lists a 
chronology of Islamabad’s efforts to end the insurgency and integrate the Baloch 
into Pakistan.  Finally, the section overlays Islamabad’s efforts at integration onto 
the monthly rates of insurgent attacks and then evaluates for correlation.  If the 
insurgency is highly sensitive to Islamabad’s actions, it will lend significant 
support to the Islamabad theory. 
The fourth insurgency provides fertile ground for this analysis for three 
reasons.  First, the data available on the specifics of insurgent attacks in the 
fourth insurgency is more complete than for any other insurgency.  Second, 
Islamabad has employed a greater variety of soft and heavy-handed approaches 
towards the Baloch in the fourth insurgency than in any other insurgency.  
Consequently, the variation of the independent variable will be greater, thereby 
allowing for a more thorough evaluation.  Finally, the fourth insurgency is ongoing 
today.  A detailed analysis of this insurgency and Islamabad’s actions can bolster 
policy recommendations that this thesis gives at its conclusion.    
1. Baloch Insurgent Attacks, 2003–2009 
The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP)91 provides the most 
comprehensive database that details the insurgent attacks in the province of 
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Balochistan during the fourth insurgency.92   The SATP registers all 
nongovernmental violence in the province and provides details behind each 
occurrence.  From 2003 to 2009, the SATP recorded 1633 attacks in the 
province of Balochistan.  A significant problem in literature that covers the fourth 
insurgency is that most data utilizes provincial levels of violence to track the 
insurgency.  However, violence in the province of Balochistan is not constrained 
to Baloch insurgents alone.  As previously stated, the Taliban and other sectarian 
groups, unaffiliated with the Baloch, operate in northern Balochistan.  
Furthermore, the Baloch tribes have a long history of inter-tribal conflict.  
Fortunately, the violent groups in Balochistan have differing intentions and, 
consequently, differing methods of employing their violence.  This enables the 
dissection of the SATP’s database in order to isolate the likely responsible 
parties behind the attacks.  For example, an attack on a NATO convoy, a Shi’ite 
procession, or a girls’ school is likely to be the responsibility of an Islamist 
organization.  Additionally, the Baloch are well-known for inter-tribal violence.  
This analysis does not consider inter-tribal violence to be pertinent to an 
examination of the Islamabad theory.  However, this analysis does regard attacks 
on policemen, gas pipelines or anything in Gwadar, for example, as likely the 
responsibility of a Baloch insurgent group.  Table 1 presents the detailed 
screening criteria that this assessment utilizes to isolate attacks that are likely of 
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Table 1.    Screening Criteria for Balochistan Attacks 
This analysis is regrettably flawed at this step.  Without complete 
knowledge of each event, specifically in targeted killings, it is inevitable that some 
spillover between the categories may occur.  It is likely that many of the targeted 
killings are the responsibility of the Baloch insurgency.  However, it is also likely 
that any such spillover would happen in both directions and have a minimal 
impact on the overall analysis.  Undoubtedly, attacks on Pakistani security 
forces, for example, are not solely the modus operandi of the Baloch.  After 
screening the SATP’s database on Balochistan attacks, the analysis determined 
that 1277 attacks were likely to be the responsibility of the Baloch insurgency.  
When separated by month, we see how the volume of attacks has changed from 
2003 to 2009.  This is reflected in Figure 2. 
 
 
Responsible Group Normal Targets  
Baloch Insurgents Energy links (gas pipelines, electricity infrastructure); 
transport links (rail, highway, air); mega projects; 
Punjabis; Security forces; political rivals 
Islamist (Taliban, Al-
Qaeda, etc.) 
NATO convoys; Shi’a/Sunni gatherings; religious 
institutions; suicide attacks; girls schools 
Other (Tribal, 
undetermined) 




Figure 2.   Attacks by month of the Baloch insurgency, 2003 to 2009 
In 2003, there was an average of 1.5 attacks per month.  By 2008, that 
average had jumped to over 33 attacks per month.  The first annual decrease in 
attacks was seen in 2009 with approximately 22 attacks each month.  Armed with 
this data, we can now examine Islamabad’s policies toward the Baloch and see if 
the volume of insurgent attacks correlates with policy implementation.  
2. Islamabad’s Policies Towards the Baloch, 2003–2009 
In order to examine Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch and their 
subsequent reaction, this analysis looks at thirteen of Islamabad’s significant 
policy events.  They encompass the three components of the Islamabad theory—
politics, economics, and military actions. They also vary between “carrots” of 
favorable actions towards the Baloch and “sticks” of kinetic actions taken by 
Islamabad to enforce their writ. This carrot and stick approach to analyzing 
Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch is reflected in Islamabad’s strategy to 
integrating the Baloch into the nation. Khuram Iqbal describes Pakistan’s 
counter-insurgency strategy as involving military and law enforcement power 
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coupled with economic development.93  This “carrot and stick” approach seems 
to be a constant presence in Islamabad’s policies and strategies.  The idea is 
that by extending economic development to the populace through mega projects, 
the strength of the Sardar is weakened and grievances become fewer.  
Furthermore, the state is obliged to punish and pursue those that do harm 
through insurgent violence.  According to Iqbal, the state clamps down on “all 
forms of dissent.”94 
Islamabad theory states that the incipient causes for the Baloch resistance 
are the policies of the central government.  Therefore, according to the 
Islamabad theory, we should see a consistent correlation between these different 
types of policies and insurgent activity.  We should see that whenever Islamabad 
takes steps to address the grievances of the Baloch, specifically in the realm of 
politics, economics, or military actions, the insurgent attacks decline.  Likewise, 
Islamabad theory predicts that whenever these grievances are exacerbated by 
Islamabad, the attacks should increase.  These trends should be consistent 
across the 84 months considered here, if the Islamabad theory most accurately 
explains the Baloch-Islamabad tensions. 
Table 2 lists the thirteen significant occurrences of Islamabad’s policy 
implementation from 2003 to 2009.  Reflected in Table 2 are the corresponding 
changes in levels of Baloch insurgent violence. The percent change in attacks is 
calculated by comparing the average level of attacks in the previous three 
months to the average level of attacks in the three months following the policy 
event.  This permits observations of the trends of attacks as opposed to simply 
one-month changes in attack volumes.  Table 2 also includes the herein 
unexplained low volumes of attacks between March-May 2006. 
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Date Event Change 
January 2005 Army sets up new base near Sui 216.67%
April 2005 Govt. agrees to withdraw troops deployed 
between Dera Bugti and Sui -73.68% 
May 2005 Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan 
presentation of results -70.00% 
December 2005 Large military campaign begins 855.56%
March-May 2006 Unknown -53.00% 
July 2006 PM Aziz rules out amnesty for “miscreants” 141.18%
August 2006 Death of Baloch Leader Bugti 160.00%
November 2006 BNP president Mengal arrested 92.31% 
November 2007 Marri, Baloch Liberation Army chief, killed 26.51% 
February 2008 Pakistan general election 32.38% 
May 2008 PM says that military operations in Balochistan 
have stopped; military agrees to withdraw; 
Mengal released -14.39% 
August 2008 Musharraf Resigns -47.90% 
October 2008 Zardari’s Balochistan Package announced -59.84% 
March 2009 Zardari’s Second Package announced -33.68% 
Table 2.   Significant policy events, 2003-2009, with corresponding changes 
in attack levels 
3. Analysis 
First, this analysis demonstrates several correlations between policy 
events and insurgent levels of violence.  Specifically, we see that when 
Islamabad addressed Baloch grievances through reduced military presence, 
offers of economic assistance, and moves towards a more complete democracy, 
attacks most often decreased.  Likewise, when Islamabad opened military bases 
in Baloch areas, conducted military campaigns against the insurgents, and 
offered disincentives to integration, attacks generally increased.  
It appears from the above data that the Islamabad theory reflects the 
outcomes of the Baloch insurgency.  However, the data above is only reflective 
of months of Islamabad’s policy events.  If the Islamabad theory is highly 
applicable, it should be able to explain most, if not all, of the significant changes 
in attack levels.  Of the 84 months considered, only 44 had a significant level of 
attacks (greater than 10 in one month).  Of these 44, 17 experienced either no 
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change or a decrease in attack levels when comparing the previous three months 
to the following three months.  There was an increase in the level of attacks in 27 
of the 44 months.  Of the 17 that saw a decrease, the eight of the ten largest 
decreases occurred within two months of one of a significant policy event 
described in Table 2.  Of the 27 months with an increase, all of the largest 10 
changes occurred within two months of a policy event listed in Table 1.  This 
bolsters support for the Islamabad theory as we see that significant changes in 
violence nearly always occurred near a major policy event. 
However, there are two significant exceptions to these trends. The first 
exception is the period of March, April, and May 2006.  These were the only 
months that experienced significant change in attack volumes without a 
correlating policy event.  Despite being sandwiched between a new military 
offensive, which saw tremendously high Baloch violence and the death of Nawab 
Bugti in August 2006, these months experienced a sharp drop in violence. In fact, 
May and June 2006 saw only five Baloch attacks each.  When compared with 24 
in January and 36 in November, this change deserves some attention.  How can 
this drop be explained?  Research of news headlines reveals only greater causes 
for increased violence.  In April, the arrest of former Balochistan Chief Minister 
and Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) chief Akhtar Mengal sparked protests across 
the province.  Yet, the SATP only recorded seven attacks that month.  
Additionally, Islamabad banned the BLA in April, labeling it a terrorist 
organization.  One could argue that these months of relative calm were a product 
of the military offensive in December and January.  It prompted Musharraf to 
declare the problem with the Baloch to have been brought under control with life 
returning to normal.95  However, should military action have been the reason for 
the rapid drop in insurgent attacks, we would expect that to be a trend throughout 
other military actions.  However, this does not seem to be the case. 
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A second notable exception in the data is the 2008 elections.  This should 
have been seen as a “carrot” to the Baloch.  The government was offering 
elections that did not face the same accusations of rigging seen in 2002.  
However, the insurgent leaders called on the Baloch to boycott the elections and 
attacked many of the polling places throughout their territories.  The calls for 
boycott were mostly seen as a rejection of the notion of integration altogether.  
This actually lends some credence to the Baloch theory, as it was clearly the 
Baloch leadership, in direct contravention to Islamabad’s steps at appeasement 
that caused the spike in violence.  However, this is the only significant exception 
in this data.  If the ignition source for Baloch violence were the Sardars, and not 
Islamabad’s policies, we would see a greater disconnect between the policy 
events and the levels of violence.  
This data strongly suggests that when offered appeasement of their 
grievances; the Baloch insurgency tempers its attacks.  The Baloch further 
integrate.  The insurgency responded quickly to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Balochistan’s initial report, seeing the degree to which some in Islamabad were 
sympathetic to their complaints.  It also responded significantly to the change in 
leadership upon Musharraf’s resignation in 2008.  However, the data also points 
to when the insurgency reacts with violence.  Unfortunately, their escalations 
often outweigh their instances of temperance.  The military campaign of early 
2006 saw three months of triple-digit escalation.  Additionally, the alleged 
targeted killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti in August of that same year caused a 
large spike in violence.    
Of anecdotal significance is the tribal jirga, or council meeting, that the 
Bugti tribe held on August 24, 2006.  In this jirga, the first of its kind in Dera Bugti, 
the Bugtis agreed to abandon the Sardari system.96  This held the potential to 
pave the way for reconciliation between the Bugtis and Islamabad and 
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significantly ease the Baloch-Islamabad problems.  However, Nawab Akbar Khan 
Bugti’s death two days later undoubtedly erased all hopes of reconciliation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This analysis gives strong support to the Islamabad theory.  It seems that 
whenever Islamabad employed strategies designed to integrate the Baloch into 
the country, the insurgency was quick to respond.  This not only gives support to 
the Islamabad theory.  It also serves as a valuable predictive tool for future policy 
decisions from Islamabad.  It seems that the insurgency is very quick to respond 
with increased violence when faced with Islamabad’s military power.  
Additionally, though, this data shows that the insurgency of the Baloch 
separatists is malleable and that Islamabad can make significant strides to quell 
the violence by utilizing their economic and political tools. 
It is clear that the Islamabad theory holds key validities in each of its 
components.  Islamabad has been less than ideal in their political dealings with 
the Baloch and has withheld the privileges of democratic participation among the 
Baloch.  Likewise, Islamabad has expropriated resources, denied revenue, and 
withheld benefits from the Baloch.  Additionally, the excessive use of military 
force has only created roadblocks to integration.  In this chapter, we saw these 
principles come to life when we compared the levels of insurgent attacks to the 
policies from Islamabad.  Consequently, the evidence seems to fit the parts of 
the theory.  This only bolsters the claims laid down by the Islamabad theory.  






IV. THE BALOCH THEORY 
The Baloch theory asserts that the tribal culture of the Baloch and their 
foreign-gained capabilities are the prime reasons for the failure of the Baloch to 
integrate into Pakistan.  The theory consists of the two components: culture and 
capabilities.  These conditions are present on the ground and, according to the 
theory, are the principal factors that inhibit any efforts to reconcile Islamabad to 
the Baloch.  This chapter first evaluates the tribal culture component of the 
Baloch theory.  It then assesses the impact of foreign influences on the capability 
of the Baloch to resist Islamabad.  Finally, this chapter analyzes the Baloch 
theory by conducting a case study comparing how the Baloch and the Bengalis 
reacted to similar policies from Islamabad.  This method allows us to vary cultural 
differences while holding the actions of Islamabad constant.  Therefore, if the 
Baloch theory accurately reflects the sources of Baloch-Islamabad tensions, we 
will find that the Baloch have reacted differently than did the Bengalis.  First, 
though, this section evaluates the two components of the Baloch theory, starting 
with tribal culture. 
A. THE TRIBAL CULTURE OF THE BALOCH 
Traipsing along the rugged border on the western edge of the Raj, British 
Colonel T. Hungerford Holdich observed first-hand the rugged terrain of the 
Baloch tribal areas.  It was 1909, and due to the ignorance created by the 
“closed-border” policy of the Raj, few British officers knew anything of the tribal 
people of their protectorate.97  He labored to explain the differences between the 
Pashtuns of the northern borderlands and Baloch of the south.  He called these 
differences between these tribes “radical.”98  Even though he could see that they  
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all followed Islam, for example, he recognized that even in this “vital principle of 
existence,” they were not of the same mind.99 This British Colonel observed that 
the Baloch people are 
easier to deal with and to control than the [Pashtun], owing to his 
tribal organization, and his freedom from bigoted fanaticism or blind 
allegiance to his priest.  He respects and honors the chief of his 
clan, who possesses far greater authority in the tribal councils than 
is the case with the [Pashtun].  The [Pashtun] is…very much under 
the influence of the Mullah…100 
The Pashtun were under the religious influence of their Mullah, whereas 
the Baloch were allegiant to their tribal chief.101  He also commented on the “far 
greater authority” of the Baloch chief, called a Sardar.  He chronicled the key 
difference between the Baloch and the Pashtun—their tribal organization.  
Hungerford also called the Baloch, “easier to deal with and to control” than the 
Pashtun.102  His statement was reflective of the British attempts to gain 
sovereignty of the region as part of their “Great Game” with Russia.  The Baloch 
formed London’s southern buffer zone against Moscow.  Yet in order to gain their 
submission, the British had to accomplish a feat never before achieved with the 
Baloch.  They had to conquer them.  Unlike previous failed efforts of the crown to 
control Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan, the “diplomatic coup” of the Baloch 
Khan of Kalat in 1876 ensured British rule over the Baloch without a shot fired.103 
However, the Pakistani government has enjoyed no such ease in dealing with the 
Baloch.  What role can this tribal system play in the integration of the Baloch into 
the mainstream of Pakistan?  Are the Sardars and their Sardari system the 
principle reason for the Baloch-Islamabad tensions, as the Baloch theory 
suggests? 
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This section analyzes the argument that the Sardars and their hierarchical 
tribal structure are a primary reason why the tribes of the Pakistani Baloch have 
rejected the government of Pakistan as their ultimate political authority.  The 
theory posits that the hierarchical nature of these tribes elevates a tribal chief to 
such a high level that integration in the state would result in the unacceptable 
loss of the chief’s power and prestige.  Therefore, the Sardari system itself 
becomes the chief impediment to successful integration.  Former Pakistani 
president Pervez Musharraf vociferously advocated this explanation of the 
Baloch problem, blaming the Sardars for inciting violence as a means of 
preserving their power and tribal traditions.104  He identified five Baloch leaders, 
calling them “anti-development Sardars” and stated, “the Sardars have been 
pampered in the past —but no more.  The writ of the state will be established in 
Balochistan.”105  He was not the first president to hold these thoughts.  Previous 
attempts to dismantle the Sardari system reflect Musharraf’s belief that the 
Sardars were the problem.  Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto both tried to dismantle it 
as part of their efforts to integrate the Baloch.  In order to effectively assess this 
claim and belief, this section first examines the nature of the Baloch tribes and 
their Sardars.  It then looks at the anthropological work on the process of 
integrating tribes into states.  
1. The Baloch—Chief-Centered Tribes 
The Pakistani Baloch are a collection of hierarchical chief-centered tribes, 
a factor that the Baloch theory argues is critical to their resistance to Islamabad.  
In most literature describing the Baloch, two characteristics precede all other 
descriptions.  First, is their moderation in Islam.  Second, is the hierarchical 
nature of their tribal culture.  When discussing the nature of the Baloch, Akbar S. 
Ahmed wrote the following: 
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The tribe is a self-contained world.  At its centre is the Sardar or 
chief of the tribe. Tall, full-bearded, in flowing clothes and heavy 
turban, the Sardar is not unlike Sean Connery playing a tribal chief.  
He symbolizes Baloch custom and tribal tradition.  Honor, 
hospitality, and bravery are displayed in his behavior.  The tribe 
revels in his glory.  The word of the Sardar is law, his authority total.  
In an area threatened by nature and, often, invading tribes unity  
under the Sardar became the key to survival.  The Baloch have a 
saying, ‘the Baloch will swear on the Holy Quran but never on the 
head of the Sardar.106 
The tribal groups of the Baloch are characterized by being centered upon 
their Sardar.  The cornerstone of tribal loyalty is allegiance to the Sardar.107  The 
Sardar is the pinnacle of a hierarchical pyramid of status and authority in the 
Baloch culture.108  Presiding over most tribal issues, the decisions of the Sardar 
are final.109   Without the approval of the Sardar, acceptance in the tribal group is 
impossible.110  As he enters an area, his knees and feet are touched and kissed 
by fellow tribesmen.111  Even youths who rebel against the Sardari system find 
that maintaining allegiance to their Sardar is honorable.112 The Sardar, tradition, 
and honor seem to stand in conflict with submission to Islamabad.  Among the 
Baloch, the state poses a threat to the power of the Sardar.  If the Baloch were to 
accept the state, the Sardar’s absolute sway over the people would be 
diminished.  By threatening the Sardar, the entire fabric of Balochi culture is 
under attack.  So as long as the Sardars resist the state, the state cannot hold 
absolute authority over the Baloch. 
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While this theory argues that the Sardari system of the Baloch make them 
hostile towards state domination, we see resistance in other forms of domination 
as well.  As previously stated, the Baloch are moderate Muslims.  Unlike the 
Pashtuns to the north, an egalitarian group wherein Islamism has taken a firm 
hold, the Baloch have rejected fundamentalist Islam.  This is because Islamism 
demands that religion be the chief arbiter of tribal issues.  Consequently, as we 
see in the Sardar’s relationship to the state, fundamentalist Islam supplants the 
Sardar and reduces his power.  As proof of this heavy influence of the Sardar, it 
is important to consider the Makran Baloch, an egalitarian, non-hierarchical 
Baloch tribe.  They, like the Pashtun, and unlike their Baloch brethren, have 
come under the influence of Islamism.113 The Makran Baloch’s tribal organization 
left it open to outside domination. 
2. Hierarchical Tribes and the State 
You would not know it by examining the Baloch-Islamabad experience, but 
social science consistently demonstrates that hierarchical tribes more easily 
integrate into states than do egalitarian, acephalous (head-less, or without a 
chief) tribes.  In order to bring a hierarchical tribe under state control, the state 
has a simple, yet daunting task.  It must bring the chief under their control.  The 
rest of the tribe will follow. This is because with hierarchical tribes, the members 
of the tribe follow one leader, often extending throughout multiple communities 
and over a large geographical area.  Louis Dumont defines hierarchical societies 
as those with a “ladder of command in which the lower rungs are encompassed 
in the higher ones in regular succession.”114 The hierarchical society directs 
individuals and sub-groups to unify the society.  The tribes’ bases for identity lie 
not in their outside authorities, but in themselves.  As a result, identity and 
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political allegiance will lie within the tribe.115  Conseqently, if the state can 
penetrate the tribal leadership, it can penetrate the entire tribe. 
By contrast, acephalous tribes are often difficult to bring under state 
control.  When these peoples are on the peripheries of the state, they are, as 
James C. Scott says, “ungraspable” by the state.116  It is the acephalous tribes, 
not the hierarchical ones, which often earn the title “barbarians.”117  The 
hierarchical tribes often earn a different reputation, owing to their tribal 
organization.  Yet the experience of the Pakistani government with the Baloch 
has been anything but easy.  Therefore, if the fault is bound up in the hierarchical 
nature of the Baloch, this theory can point to only one source—the Sardars.  If 
the Sardar does not submit to the writ of the state, his subjects will likewise rebel.   
3. Conclusion 
A first point of the Baloch theory is that due to the heavy influence of the 
Sardar as given by the hierarchical tribal culture, the Baloch have rejected the 
state of Pakistan.  This component of the Baloch theory works reasonably well to 
explain some aspects of the Baloch problem.  It demonstrates the centrality of 
the Sardar’s leadership and somewhat validates Musharraf’s criticisms.  
However, it is incomplete.  We now add to the Baloch theory by discussing the 
possibilities of foreign sources adding to the capabilities of the Baloch.  
B. CAPABILITIES—THE “FOREIGN HAND” AMONG THE BALOCH  
The second component of the Baloch theory involves the enhanced 
capabilities of the Baloch.  It asserts that the Baloch are receiving help from 
foreign sources.  This pushes them away from Islamabad, making integration 
even more difficult.  This idea of foreign influence on the Baloch insurgency takes 
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many forms, but often many see it as more critical to the Baloch-Islamabad 
tensions than Islamabad’s policies.  This was evident in journalist Nicholas 
Schmidle’s interaction with a Pakistani Naval officer in Karachi.  “The trouble in 
Baluchistan,” the officer told Schmidle, “is because of an international 
dimension…There are outside hands helping these rebels.  Why are you people 
fighting proxy wars in my country?”118  The “helping hands” to which the officer 
referenced take two forms.  In one form is the assertion of the Baloch theory that 
foreign governments are actively supporting the Baloch insurgency.  These 
accusations include help from a wide variety of intelligence agencies including 
the CIA, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing of India), Israeli Moussad, British 
MI-6, Afghanistan, and Russian services.  However, the most prominent 
discussions of foreign government interference point to assistance from Indian 
and Afghan hands.  Beyond governmental support, the second form of “helping 
hands” is the influx of cash brought about by the extensive smuggling network 
run by the Baloch.  Opium and other illicit drugs regularly transit Balochistan 
destined for global markets.  Guns, ammunition, and other black market supplies 
make the return trip with destinations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In the case of 
smuggling, the Baloch-Islamabad tensions are good for business.  With a 
government unable to enforce its writ on a large swath of land, the smuggling 
industry faces fewer challenges.  This in turn creates a stronger incentive to push 
away from Islamabad.  This section of the Baloch theory examines both 
components of outside help.  However, it looks first to the importance of outside 
assistance to insurgencies. 
Theory on insurgent movements reflects the argument of a “helping hand.”  
In his seminal work on counterinsurgency warfare, David Galula posits that a 
lasting cause is necessary for the success of an insurgency.119  Without this 
cause, a band of rebels without a cause are simply miscreants with a plot to 
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seize power.  An insurgency needs a cause.  But, Galula does not identify a 
cause as being the only “prerequisite for a successful insurgency.”  He points out 
the impact of what he calls “outside support.”   Outside support in the form of 
military assistance becomes absolutely required as the insurgency progresses.  
The need for better supplies, advanced strategies, and improved information 
operations is crucial for the insurgency’s survival.  In acquiring these necessities, 
the insurgent has three choices.  First, the insurgent can get them from the 
counterinsurgent, the military against which he fights.  The Afghan mujahedeen 
were exceptional at this skill.  A prime example of this is today’s Afghan air force, 
made up of refit Russian helicopters captured by the mujahedeen.120  His second 
option is to receive them via an external hand of support.121  Most scholars agree 
that without the external support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
and others, the Soviets would have remained in Afghanistan.  Third, the 
insurgent can raise the money by means of illicit trade.  From drugs to diamonds, 
many insurgencies maintain their momentum by illegal enterprise.  Galula shows 
us that a successful insurgency must have outside assistance in order to survive.  
With the Baloch conducting their fourth insurgency, it seems to make sense that 
they are receiving some support from foreign sources.  Historical evidence 
confirms such foreign support in the past insurgencies. 
1. A Historical Perspective on Foreign Involvement with the 
 Baloch  
The Soviets and Afghans dominate the historical evidence of foreign 
support to Baloch nationalist and separatist movements.  The Baloch issue 
gained international attention following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   Many 
feared that the Soviets would invade Baloch territories in order to secure a route 
to the Arabian Sea.  A.B. Awan shared this fear, saying,  
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the most ominous threat comes from the occupation, in fact, 
annexation of Afghanistan…  With Soviet air power installed at the 
sprawling Shindand air base near Herat, a mere 350 miles from the 
coastline, and at Qandahar, with more bases in the offing, backed  
by the new rail-road link over the Amu Darya at Hairatan, the Soviet 
Posture is menacing and frightening.  It is in this light that 
Baluchistan has to be seen.122 
Selig Harrison likewise acknowledged this nightmare as he described a 
potential scenario.  “Armed with sophisticated Soviet weaponry, a determined 
Baluch guerilla army, using Afghanistan as a staging area, proclaims an 
independent People’s Republic of Baluchistan in part of what is now 
southwestern Pakistan.”123  Harrison’s 1981 work on the Baloch, In Afghanistan’s 
Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations seizes on the possibility of 
expanded Soviet control among the Baloch.  However, Harrison’s final 
conclusion on the threat of Soviet influence on the Baloch was not as grim.  
Harrison asserted that while the Soviets saw a benefit from a fractured Pakistan, 
they did not see in the Baloch a group of people well organized and motivated 
along Marxist-Leninist lines.124  They were hopeful that a communist revolution 
would emerge within the Baloch, but were reticent to become directly involved.125  
For their part, the Soviets enjoyed a good image among the Baloch as many 
Baloch sensed that the Soviets were friendly to underprivileged third world 
peoples.126  Consequently, the Baloch tribal leaders welcomed the idea of help 
from the Soviets.127  While Marxist ideologies did take some hold among the 
Baloch, most notably with Khair Bux Marri, the Sardar of the violent Marri tribe, 
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the Marxist ideology did not trump pushes for independence from Pakistan.  It 
was this ideological lack of commitment that pushed Moscow away.128 
Kabul, on the other hand, has played a much larger role in supporting 
Baloch separatism.  They provided political and logistical support to the first three 
Baloch insurgencies, most notably in the form of refuge from Islamabad.  In the 
first insurgency, Abdul Karim, the prince of Kalat, staged his insurgency from 
Afghanistan.129  While there, he petitioned both Moscow and Kabul for 
support.130  According to Pakistani sources, Karim’s insurgency received 
significant support from Kabul, an assertion that Baloch nationalists deny.131  
After getting released from jail, Abdul Karim launched the second Baloch 
insurgency.  Islamabad insisted that again Karim had negotiated with 
Afghanistan for support of the insurgency.132  Despite being armed with little 
evidence of this assertion, the belief that Afghanistan was helping Baloch rebels 
continued.  The third insurgency saw the most direct support from Kabul.  
Mohammad Daud, the prime minister of Afghanistan, permitted the Pararis, a 
large group of Baloch rebels, to establish two camps on the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border.  While labeled “refugee camps,” the Pararis utilized them as their 
insurgent headquarters.133  As part of his pacification of the Baloch, Zia extended 
amnesty the Baloch rebels living in Afghanistan, thereby allowing their return to 
Pakistan.134  
A notable event involving foreign governments and the Baloch occurred in 
1973.  Tipped off by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the Sardar of the Bugti tribe the 
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police in Islamabad uncovered a massive arms shipment in the Iraqi embassy.135  
This shipment included five hundred Soviet submachine guns, a thousand 
grenades, and thousands of rounds of ammunition.136  The Pakistani media 
asserted that the weapons were destined for anti-Pakistan insurrectionists.137  
Prime Minister Bhutto linked them to the Baloch.138  The Iraqi government 
claimed they were destined for Iranian Baloch rebels.  Many now assert that 
Prime Minister Bhutto’s push to label the Pakistani Baloch as the arms’ recipients 
was a ploy to declare martial law days later.139 
It is clear that historically the Baloch have received outside assistance.  
However, it is also clear that this assistance has not been substantial. The 
Afghan government permitting the establishment of a few tent camps is much 
different than providing tanks, artillery, or direct maneuver support.  For this 
reason, the Baloch of the third insurgency fought Iranian helicopter gunships with 
nineteenth century Enfield rifles.140  Is the fourth insurgency any different?  If 
there is government-level assistance, is it more substantial than in the previous 
three insurgencies?  What roles do the apolitical influences of drugs and gun 
smuggling play?  This next section evaluates at possibilities of foreign 
governmental influence in today’s ongoing insurgency. 
2. Foreign Government Influence 
This thesis is not assuming that it will prove or disprove the existence of 
foreign meddling in the Baloch insurgency.  While the Pakistani government 
maintains that it has ample evidence of Afghan and Indian involvement, most 
outside of Pakistan disagree.  As of this publication, the government of Pakistan 
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has yet to make such evidence public.  Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton asserted that there is no evidence of India’s involvement in Balochistan 
despite Pakistani allegations.141  Given the lack of published evidence, this 
section discusses the most common accusations from Pakistani sources and 
evaluates the interests of India and Afghanistan in the Baloch. 
a. Accusation: Indian Consulates 
Many Pakistanis assert that the strongest demonstration of India’s 
support of the Baloch insurgency has been in the form of an inordinate number of 
Indian consulates in Afghanistan.  Khalid Khokar asserts that these 26 “centers 
of terrorism” are the primary conduits by which the Indians are “planning, 
commissioning and preparing acts of terrorism in Balochistan.”142 Khokar does 
not expand on his calculation of 26 consulates.  The Indian government 
acknowledges only three consulates and one embassy.143  Pakistani Senator 
Mushahid Hussain Sayed asserts that these consulates “serve as launching pads 
for undertaking covert operations against Pakistan from the Afghan soil.”144  
There is an abundance of references in Indian and Pakistani periodicals to Indian 
activity in Afghanistan in support of the Baloch.  However, nearly all are based 
upon anecdotal research and incomplete knowledge.   
Therefore, it is important to consider the established facts.  India 
does have three consulates in Afghanistan.  Only one, Kandahar, is in close 
enough proximity to aid the Baloch.  Is India unusual in having three consulates 
and one embassy in Afghanistan?  Iran and Pakistan also have consulates in 
Kandahar. Pakistan also has consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.  Regarding 
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official consulates, India is not conducting any unusual activity.  Khokar’s number 
(some report as many as 40 consulates) undoubtedly reflects the possibility that 
India is operating out of their consulates and out of a series of undeclared 
camps.  This is a possibility.  Consequently, the accusation of Indian consulates 
being used to support Baloch rebels cannot be dismissed outright.  However, 
though, we should be reticent to accept it as established fact. 
Furthermore, some Indian actions seem to indicate that Delhi may 
be supporting the insurgency through Afghanistan.  At the conference of 
nonaligned states in Egypt last year, both Prime Ministers Gilani of Pakistan and 
Singh of India agreed to look at the Baloch issue.145   Many in the Indian press 
took this as a tacit admission of involvement with the Baloch.  As previously 
stated, C. Christine Fair asserted that the Indian consulate in Iranian Balochistan 
has been a supporter of Baloch separatists there. 
b. Accusation: Advanced Supplies 
A convincing argument in support of the “foreign hand” argument is 
the improved military capabilities of the Baloch insurgency.  As previously noted, 
the Baloch lack of outside support in the third insurgency forced them to fight with 
their nineteenth century rifles against Islamabad and Tehran’s jets, gunships, and 
artillery.  The fourth insurgency has witnessed a marked change in insurgent 
technology.  They have repeatedly utilized rockets, hand grenades, land mines, 
and advanced explosives in their operations.  Furthermore, despite the duration 
of the fourth insurgency, now in its eighth year, the insurgents are still capable of 
launching many attacks.  Without an industrial base, how are the Baloch 
acquiring such capabilities and technologies?  Many point to a supply base 
coming from foreign governments sympathetic to the Baloch. This argument is 
compelling.  However, foreign governments are not the only routes through which 
the Baloch can acquire advanced weaponry.   
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c. India’s Interests in Balochistan 
To assess the likelihood that India is “fomenting trouble in 
Balochistan,” it is important to consider India’s interests in such action.  How 
could a destabilized Balochistan help India?  Likewise, how could a successful 
Baloch insurgency hurt India?  Some point to India’s strategic concerns, 
especially with respect to Pakistan.  Concerned about denying Pakistan strategic 
depth, some argue that India has exploited Afghan-Pakistani tensions.  By 
creating chaos in Pakistan’s western border regions, it eases India’s tensions on 
the India-Pakistan border and reduces the relevance of the Kashmir issue.  While 
these factors may in some part describe India’s interests regarding Balochistan, 
they do not provide as clear a picture as India’s economic situation, especially as 
far as energy is concerned. 
Economically, India seeks to retain its meteoric rise and 
ascendancy into the world’s great powers. Despite the current global economic 
downturn, India has sustained strong economic growth.  Its gross domestic 
product (GDP) has consistently exceeded 6 percent since 2000.  In 2008, India’s 
GDP growth outpaced the top 20 world economies. Critical to their economic 
progress has been a reliance on fossil fuels.  Without these fuels, their economic 
infrastructure would grind to a halt.  Unfortunately, Indian domestic energy 
resources cannot meet these energy requirements.  India lacks the necessary 
deposits of oil, natural gas, and uranium to fuel its economy.  Consequently, it 
has scanned the globe in search of energy partners to meet demands.  In doing 
so, India has created relationships with nations in South America, Africa, 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.  The Baloch territories play 
into this picture, particularly regarding pipelines and the Gwadar port.   
Pipeline geopolitics suggest that India is interested in the stability of 
the Baloch territories.  As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the pipelines 
originating from Turkmenistan and Iran will transit Baloch homelands.  Therefore, 
Baloch instability would be detrimental to Indian interests.  International pipelines 
transiting these tribal areas would be opportune targets for insurgents.  A primary 
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reason that the Baloch insurgent groups have repeatedly targeted natural gas 
pipelines is because it affects thousands of people downstream.  For example, 
an explosion near Sui, a large Bugti tribe city, will affect gas customers in 
Karachi.  This gives their cause more attention.  If Baloch activity could affect gas 
supplies to India, it would raise the Baloch issue to a much higher level.  
Furthermore, India’s energy supplies would be insecure.  The pipeline factor 
shows how Indian involvement in the Baloch insurgency could be detrimental to 
Indian energy interests. 
However, Gwadar port (Figure 3) presents an alternative view of 
Indian interests.  At Gwadar instability is beneficial to India.  The project to build a 
deep-water, year-round operational hub port contains the potential to restore 
Pakistan’s economy while bolstering strategic and economic interests of China, 
Pakistan’s closest ally.  Not surprisingly, India has criticized the development of 
the Gwadar port.  India’s naval chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, said that Gwadar 
could be used by Pakistan to “take control over the world energy jugular.”146  In 
Gwadar, many see serious strategic implications for India.  Gwadar port gives 
Beijing an “outpost on the Indian Ocean”147 as well as strategic depth to the 
Pakistani navy.    
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Figure 3.   Gwadar’s Strategic Location (source: 
http://gawadarinnltd.com/page_1161468194468.html) 
In response to the development of Gwadar, India is helping Iran 
with a competing project in Chabahar.  India’s economic alliance with Iran is in 
direct response to the economic threat of Gwadar.  Chabahar’s location, only 120 
miles from Gwadar, is astonishingly close.  It shares the Gwadar advantages of 
being outside the Strait of Hormuz and is accessible from Central Asia.  India’s 
help in building Chabahar is helping to pave the way for Central Asian access.  
Although Chabahar is not as developed as Gwadar, it contains significant 
potential for Iran and India.  Additionally, in 2003 the Indian Border Roads 
Organization announced plans to build a 200-kilometer road that would connect 
Chabahar to Afghanistan’s garland route.148  India has also forged an economic 
alliance with Afghanistan.  In 2007, India became Afghanistan’s fifth largest 
donor with $750 million in aid given each year.  India also took steps to include 
Afghanistan in the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
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(SAARC).149  India’s goal in Afghanistan is to use it as a door through which they 
may gain access to the CARs.  As India races Pakistan and China for access to 
Central Asia, a destabilized Balochistan is advantageous to India. 
Additionally, Gwadar presents a threat to India’s pursuit of regional 
hegemony. Ashley Tellis posits that “India seeks to provide a modicum of 
hegemonic stability…to the region at large.”150  India’s hegemonic power has 
been rooted in military victories while maintained by economic prowess.  India 
has sought to maintain that position.151  Of critical importance to India’s economy 
is India’s ability to ship goods overseas.  Hindrances in shipping lanes can 
severely damage their standing.  India’s principal economic competitor is China.  
India sees China as an external threat to Indian regional hegemony.152  
Furthermore, India knows that Pakistan, through the help of an external partner, 
could limit India’s hegemonic ambitions.153  As India looks out across its 
landscape, it sees growing Chinese influence surrounding it.  The deep naval ties 
that China holds with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar serve to make India 
wary of Chinese involvement elsewhere in the Indian Ocean.  Chinese 
involvement in Tibet and Nepal can only enhance an Indian sense of Chinese 
encirclement.154  Furthermore, as the regional hegemon of South Asia, they must 
maintain the status quo.  Gwadar is upsetting to India as it is disrupting this 
regional stability.  It affords Pakistan naval depth, offers the Chinese a future 
naval base, and guarantees a shifting of the balance of power in the Arabian 
Sea. 
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Therefore, it is clear that Indian interests with the Baloch are by no 
means simple.  Pipeline issues point away from Indian interest in Baloch 
instability.  Gwadar port points in the opposite direction.  A myriad of additional 
issues are tangentially related to this issue as well.  India’s own concerns with 
domestic insurgencies, prospects of Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, and India’s 
image of a “responsible power,” as President Obama affirmed,155 head a list of 
additional Indian concerns with the Baloch issue.  However, it seems that the 
only large benefit to supporting a Baloch insurgency is a reduced effectiveness of 
Gwadar port.  While Gwadar does threaten Indian hegemonic perceptions, the 
price that India would pay in lost energy security, reduced international standing, 
as well as increased insurgent activity in India should not be ignored.  This 
section now turns to Afghanistan and considers its interests in stoking the Baloch 
rebellion. 
d. Afghanistan’s Interests with the Baloch 
 Afghanistan’s interests in the Baloch and their territory appear to be 
more linked to historical and ideological themes rather than economic factors.  
Afghanistan has traditionally been an advocate of Baloch separatism from 
Islamabad.156  Many perceive this interest to be founded in the concept of 
Pashtunistan, an ethnically based homeland for Pashtuns.  Some concepts of 
Pashtunistan extend beyond the territories of Pashto-speaking peoples and 
include the Baloch as well. Figure 3 is a representation of a Pashtunistan that 
includes the Baloch tribal areas.  
                                            
155  Barack H. Obama, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India in 
Joint Press Conference," The White House, November 24, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india-joint-press-conference 
(accessed December 7, 2009). 
156 Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 141. 
 57
 
Figure 4.   Contemporary interpretation of Pashtunistan (source: 
 http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/pashtunistan.gif) 
This incorporation of the Baloch territories into Afghanistan links 
back to the seventeenth century. Ahmad Shah Durrani, then the king of 
Afghanistan, ruled over the Baloch state of Kalat for fourteen years.157  
Consequently, when Kabul complains about the British-demarcated border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line, it occasionally includes the 
Baloch as part of their rightful territory.  In 1978, the Afghan Prime Minister 
Hafizullah Amin said that the Durand Line “tore us apart” and that, “we will do our 
historical duty when the time is right.”  As a result of this commitment to the 
Afghan interpretation of the Afghan-Pakistan border, Amin said that the “Baloch 
nationalist movement is very dear to us.”158  Naturally, today the inclusion of the 
Baloch territories into landlocked Afghanistan would have profound benefits for 
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Afghanistan.  While these benefits are apparent, Afghanistan will suffer from a 
loss of pipeline revenues if the TAPI pipeline is not established.  This is 
contingent upon Baloch pacification.   
Selig Harrison pointed out in 1981 that one glance at the map of 
Balochistan reveals its relevance to many international players.159  Many more 
countries have economic, strategic, and political interests in the integration of the 
Baloch people.  This thesis does not analyze the interests of China, Iran, the 
United States, or Britain.  It instead focuses on India and Afghanistan as 
politicians, journalists, and other Pakistani leaders most often cite them for 
causing the troubles with the Baloch. However, it is important now to turn to the 
potential of smuggling as a foreign source by which the Baloch can receive 
enhanced capabilities. 
3. Apolitical Influence on Baloch Capabilities: Smuggling 
The Baloch are intimately involved in the smuggling of drugs and guns in 
and out of Afghanistan.  The export route for Afghan opium is most often via 
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.160  Afghanistan’s most volatile region, Helmand 
province, borders the Chagai district, Balochistan province’s largest district.  
Baramcha, a city in Chagai, serves as a major smuggling center as well as a 
base for heroin production.  The “kingpin” of Baramcha is Haji Juma Khan, a 
Baloch who, until his arrest in 2008, ran a large and powerful smuggling 
network.161  The smuggling of drugs, guns, and even inexpensive Iranian oil has 
caused the Iranian government to begin sealing the Iran-Pakistan border with a 
concrete fence.162  For the Baloch, illicit trade is lucrative.  The income generated  
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form illicit trading enhances Baloch insurgent capabilities.  They can easily turn to 
the black market to acquire rockets, hand grenades, rifles, explosives, and 
ammunition.163   
Svante E. Cornell sees a direct link between the strength of insurgent 
resistance and the trafficking of narcotics.  As the business of drugs gets tied in 
to insurgent groups, these groups get stronger while the state becomes 
weaker.164  This is not because of the narcotics themselves, but because of the 
economic power of the drug trade.  Cornell’s argument is not that drugs cause 
wars, but that they are especially relevant to protracting a civil war.165  A result is 
that the insurgents begin to embrace economic motivations for continuing the 
war.166   Cornell’s arguments make sense when we consider the Baloch.  If they 
integrate into Pakistan, the law and order situation would improve as far as 
Islamabad is concerned.  This would mean improved border security and an 
increased amount of law enforcement along trafficking routes.  As a result, 
smugglers would be profoundly affected by Baloch integration.   
Therefore, the smuggling of drugs and guns provides a financial resource 
for the Baloch insurgency, props up involved Sardars, and reduces Baloch 
inclinations towards joining the Pakistani mainstream.  It seems to answer the 
questions regarding the enhanced capabilities of the Baloch insurgency, 
especially with respect to advanced weapons.  It also provides possible 
incentives to push the Baloch away from Islamabad.   
C. COMPARING CULTURES, CAPABILITIES, AND RESPONSES 
The Baloch theory posits that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch 
tribes are the determining factors in their resistance to integration into the 
Pakistani state.  There is something particularly rebellious about the Baloch, who 
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when combined with foreign enhancements to their capabilities, are increasingly 
unlikely to integrate into Pakistan.  Baloch resistance is not due to the policies of 
Islamabad, the theory argues.  Were this an accurate explanation of Baloch-
Islamabad tensions, what would we find?  We would find that in cases where 
Islamabad acted similarly to other peripheral ethnic groups, those groups would 
have displayed a differing level of integration than the Baloch.  Other peripheral 
ethnic groups would have responded in a manner consistent with their culture 
and capabilities.  If the Baloch theory is valid, we would not find many similarities 
in the integration of other ethnic groups, particularly groups whose culture and 
capabilities significantly differ from the Baloch.   
This understanding forms the basis for a final evaluation of the Baloch 
theory.  This section conducts an analysis of the Baloch theory by comparing the 
Baloch to the Bengalis of former East Pakistan.  The Bengalis were an ethnic 
group culturally different and armed with very different capabilities when 
compared to the Baloch.  Furthermore, they were on the receiving end of policies 
from Islamabad that are continuing in Baloch-oriented policies today.  Therefore, 
if the Baloch theory is valid, we should expect to find that the resistance of the 
Bengalis to Islamabad was markedly different than today’s resistance of the 
Baloch.  This would demonstrate that it is the Baloch culture and capabilities, not 
the actions of Islamabad, which push the Baloch away from national integration.  
However, if we find similarities in the Baloch and Bengalis in their reactions to the 
state, the Baloch theory may be brought into question.  For a historical 
background of the Bengali grievances and the 1971 War, the author 
recommends Christophe Jaffrelot’s work, A History of Pakistan and its Origins. 
1. Case Selection 
To compare the Baloch to the Bengalis is not a new concept. Among the 
Baloch, nationalists are quick to draw comparisons between East Pakistan and 
the Baloch’s irredentist struggle.  The Bengalis, after all, conducted a successful 
separatist movement that resulted in civil war, independence from Pakistan, and 
 61
the creation of Bangladesh.  To illustrate this, a Baloch senator remarked, “the 
other day there was a delegation from Bangladesh sitting in the visitor's gallery of 
the house, and if we don't resolve matters, the next could be from 
Balochistan.”167 The separatists attempt to compare the Baloch to the Bengalis in 
order to show Islamabad that policies that caused the “second partition” in 1971 
may cause a third.  However, this thesis utilizes this comparison for a different 
purpose.  A comparison of the Baloch to the Bengalis permits an analysis of the 
Baloch culture and capabilities and their responses to similar policies from 
Islamabad. While most critics of the Bengali-Baloch comparison highlight the 
differences between the two cultures, this analysis sees these differences as 
assets.  The culture, history, and capabilities of the Baloch and the Bengalis are 
vastly different.  Consequently, should the Baloch theory hold true, similar 
actions by Islamabad should produce different reactions from the Baloch than it 
produced from the Bengalis.  In order to validate this case selection, this section 
first explains how the Baloch are different than the Bengalis.  It then explains how 
the policies of Islamabad toward both were similar.  Finally, this evaluation of the 
Baloch theory compares the reaction of both people groups. 
2. Differences Between Bengalis and Baloch 
It is important to note the differences between the Bengalis and the 
Baloch.  Were the Baloch and Bengalis similar in their cultures and capabilities, it 
would be a pointless endeavor to compare their reactions to Islamabad through a 
lens of culture and capabilities.   
a. Culture 
Culturally, the Baloch share some similarities with Bengalis of East 
Pakistan.  However, these similarities are few.  Their only commonalities lie in 
religion and marriage.  Both the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Baloch have a 
population that predominantly consists of Sunni Muslims who follow the 
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moderate Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.168 They also both follow the 
custom of arranged marriages.169  However, after these two factors we see few 
similarities. Three areas of cultural differences are most evident.  They are 
natural geography, human factors, and history. 
Natural geographic factors define the first set of differences 
between the Baloch and the Bengalis.  The Baloch occupy a large area of 
inhospitable deserts and harsh mountains.170  The Bengalis live in a much 
smaller area that is dominated by a large alluvial, deltaic plain.171  The Baloch 
live outside of the monsoon belt,172 while each year hundreds of Bengalis die in 
monsoon floods.  Nineteen people per square kilometer occupy the Baloch 
lands.173 In 1974, three years after independence from Pakistan, the former East 
Pakistanis numbered 71 million, well over fourteen times the Baloch 
population.174  Furthermore, their small land area contributed to their population 
density being 460 people per square kilometer, 24 times the population density of 
the Baloch. This has tremendous social impacts as factors such as access to 
agriculture, conflict, and political structures reflect their geographical context.  A 
factor stemming directly from physical geography is the peoples’ lifestyles.  The 
Baloch are predominantly nomadic people whose subsistence depends upon 
limited agriculture and pastoralism.175   Two-thirds of the Bengalis, on the other 
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hand, are farmers, owing largely to the overabundance of water.176  
Consequently, nearly all Bengalis, save the residents of Dhaka, live in small, 
established villages.177  Many Baloch spend their winters in tents as they herd 
their sheep, goats, cattle, and camels across the desert.178 
Human factors illustrate the next set of Baloch-Bengali differences. 
Demographically, the Bengalis outnumber the Baloch drastically.  Bengali 
population hovers around 100 million, whereas most statistics claim that the 
Baloch of Pakistan are numbered at less than 5 million.  This gives rise to their 
differences in social structure.  Stemming from a need to control vast areas of 
terrain, the Baloch political structure developed into a hereditary chieftainship as 
discussed earlier.  The Bengalis, owing largely to their densely packed 
population and village lifestyle, became dependent upon established 
governments to control political power.179 Among the Bengalis, a large-scale 
hierarchical system did not develop.  However, we see that the Baloch are 
defined by the tribal system in which they operate.  The Bengalis have no such 
tribal identity.  Another product of this context is the propensity towards conflict 
among these peoples.  The Baloch have a historical reputation of being a strong 
warrior class, owing to their need to defend their territory from foreign forces and 
other tribes.180  The Bengalis, though, see a much lower level of conflict.  They 
were regarded by the British as an effeminate non-martial race181 and rarely see 
conflict escalate beyond the village level.182  A final critical human difference is 
the land structures among these peoples.  Stemming from their chief-centered 
society, few Baloch own land.  Traditionally among the Baloch, land is vested into 
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the tribe in a feudalistic system.183  The Bengalis, though, enjoy a high 
percentage of land ownership, individually owned on family farms.184 
A final set of key differences is evident in the histories of these 
people.  First, we consider religion.  Islam migrated with the Baloch when they 
migrated, according to tradition, from the Middle East.  The Baloch consider 
themselves to be direct descendants of Amir Hamza, an uncle of the prophet 
Muhammad.185  Islam came to the Bengalis through Mughal conquest, long after 
the Baloch became Muslims.186  Furthermore, the Bengalis, while also Sunni 
Muslims of the Hanafi School, are not universally Muslim.  The Bengalis of East 
Pakistan represented roughly half of the total Bengali population in South Asia in 
1947.  The other half, mostly Hindus, occupied the Indian state of West Bengal.  
Even within the Muslim-majority East Pakistan, only 85 percent of the Bengalis 
were Muslim.187  The remainders were mostly Hindu with some Christians and 
Buddhist as well.  An additional point of history that divides these peoples is the 
influence of the British.  Throughout most of the British experience in India, the 
colonialists did not affect the Baloch. This changed in 1876 when the British 
bought off the Baloch leadership in order to create a buffer zone of crown-
sympathetic tribes to counter Russian influence.  As a result, the Baloch 
experienced 71 years of British indirect rule.  The Bengalis, however, were the 
recipients of significant British influence.  The East India Trading Company, the 
forerunner to the Raj, set its capital in the Bengali city of Calcutta.  The British 
directly ruled over the Bengalis from 1757 to 1947.  For 190 years, the Raj had 
tremendous influence on the Bengali way of life, to include the establishment of 
English as a medium for higher-level education.188  A final historical difference is  
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seen in partition.  The Muslims of Bengal fought to join Pakistan, celebrating 
when they became Pakistanis.  The Baloch, however, resisted the government of 
Pakistan from, literally, “day one.” 
b. Capabilities 
Differences in their foreign-granted capabilities are also prevalent 
between the Baloch and the Bengalis.  During their fight for independence from 
Pakistan, the Bengalis enjoyed an unequivocally direct hand of support from 
India.  India openly trained the Bengali resistance, the Mukhti Bahini.  They 
provided military training, protection, and weapons.189  When war did break out, 
India willingly deployed its own troops to fight Pakistan.  The Baloch insurgencies 
have enjoyed some support from foreign sources.  Specifically, Afghanistan and 
the Soviet Union provided sanctuary and some guidance to the Baloch.  Iraq was 
accused of smuggling weapons to the Baloch.  However, their support has never 
reached the level of India’s support to the Bengalis.  Not once has a foreign army 
publicly deployed troops alongside the Baloch in their campaigns against 
Islamabad.190  Additionally, the Baloch profit significantly from the illicit trade of 
drugs and guns.  The Bengalis did not have large-scale profits from such 
activities.  Their foreign-based capabilities were significantly different than the 
Baloch. 
We see that there is a substantial amount of cultural and 
capabilities-based differences between the Baloch and the Bengalis.  
Consequently, the Baloch theory predicts that, given the immense differences 
between these peoples, they should react differently to similar policies from 
Islamabad.  
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3. Similarities in Islamabad’s Actions 
Thus far, this section has demonstrated that the cultures and capabilities 
of the Baloch and Bengalis are strikingly different.  Consequently, this evaluation 
has two unique dependent variables, the reactive behaviors of the Baloch and 
the Bengalis to Islamabad. At this point, the evaluation assesses the independent 
variable, Islamabad’s policies.  In order for this variable to be truly independent, 
though, this analysis must demonstrate that it has been nearly identical for both 
of the dependent variables.  That is, the policies of Islamabad towards the Baloch 
must be similar to the policies of the Bengalis of East Pakistan.   
Islamabad has employed similar policies and tactics among the Baloch 
that it did towards the Bengalis.  As a result of these similar policies, this chapter 
is able to evaluate the influence of cultural differences between the two ethnic 
groups upon their resistances to national integration.  The similar policies include 
the denial of democracy, natural resource expropriation, exclusion from national 
benefits, and excessive military force. 
a. Denial of Democracy 
Among the Bengalis of East Pakistan, three critical events revealed 
Islamabad’s refusal to extend full democratic rights to their countrymen.  First 
was the One Unit Scheme, where the four provinces of West Pakistan were 
combined into one province to electorally marginalize the populous Bengalis.191  
Second was the refusal of the central government to consider the Six Point 
Program, a proposal designed to grant the province of East Pakistan greater 
democratic rights.192  The final indication of democracy denied was the  
refusal of the Punjabi-dominated central government to permit the majority party, 
the Bengali-dominated Awami League to form a new government after the 1970 
elections.193   
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For the Baloch, Islamabad also denied them democracy.  As 
previously discussed in Chapter II, these political policies often resulted in 
heightened insurgent activities if not the start of new uprisings.  So regarding 
political treatment, the Bengalis and the Baloch experienced similar policies. 
b. Natural Resource Expropriation 
The central government has made policies toward both the Baloch 
and the Bengalis to utilize their natural resources for the benefit of the central 
government.  In East Pakistan, the primary resource concerned was jute.  From 
1962–1971, profits from jute exports provided Pakistan with over half of all 
foreign exchange earnings.194  At one point, Pakistan enjoyed a 65 percent 
market share of the global jute trade.195  The national government rapidly 
nationalized the jute trade.  Despite the wealth of raw material in East Pakistan, 
the western province was the principal beneficiary.196  The government also 
controlled the foreign exchange rate at which East Pakistan would get paid for 
the jute.197  This was solely for the benefit of the central government.  
For the Baloch, their experience is similar.  As seen in Chapter II, 
the Baloch have consistently seen the center utilize their natural resources for 
the benefit of Islamabad.  Resources under ground, over land, and on the 
coastline have come under direct control of Islamabad, often to the detriment of 
the Baloch.  These policies have been a constant source of angst among the 
Baloch. 
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c. Exclusion from National Benefits 
An additional similarity is the exclusion of the Bengalis and Baloch 
from national benefits.  In East Pakistan, the central government’s policies 
excluded the Bengalis from their proper share of national income, aid, and other 
benefits.  Despite their demographic dominance over West Pakistan, they 
continually saw international aid being used to finance projects in the West.198  
Under President Ayub Khan, only one third of the national development was 
aimed at East Pakistan.199 
The Baloch, as previously discussed, have also experienced the 
government’s policies of economic exclusion.  As a percentage of GDP, 
Balochistan has not experienced a rise in their share of the national income.  In 
fact, it has declined.  Between 1972–73 and 1999–2000, Balochistan’s share of 
the GDP declined from 4.5 to 3.7 percent.200  For natural gas, Balochistan 
received only 12.4 percent of its due royalties.   
d. Excessive Military Force 
A final component of similarity between Islamabad’s policies 
towards the Baloch and the Bengalis of East Pakistan is excessive military force.  
The Pakistani government has traditionally utilized military force against both the 
Baloch and the Bengalis as a tool to maintain their writ over the people.  Among 
the Bengalis in East Pakistan, the violence exhibited on March 25, 1971, 
“Operation Searchlight,” sparked the 1971 Civil War.  In Operation Searchlight, 
the Pakistani military, backed by pro-Pakistani militias and Islamic groups, 
attacked the campus of Dhaka University and other sites of resistance, to include 
Hindu villages.201  Following the outrage of these assassinations, Awami League 
chief Sheikh Mujabir Rahman’s ally, Major Ziaur Rahman, officially declared 
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independence.202  Throughout the next nine months, most estimate that between 
1 and 3 million Bengalis lost their lives in the war.  Rounaq Jahan asserts that the 
Army’s actions were clearly genocidal.203  
Chapter II elaborated on the topic of military excess towards the 
Baloch.  During each insurgency, the Army or other paramilitary forces have 
conducted operations that go beyond the normally accepted pale of appropriate 
uses of force.  Consequentially, it is clear that the Baloch experienced the same 
policies felt by the Bengalis.  
4. Comparing the Baloch and Bengali Reactions 
As previously discussed, the response to many of the Islamabad policies 
towards the Baloch has been armed struggle.  Their four insurgencies coincide 
with controversial policies from Islamabad.  Granted, these policies often found 
their genesis in a desire by Islamabad to integrate the Baloch into Pakistan.  
When the military coerced the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan, it was for the 
purpose of Baloch integration.  When One Unit unified West Pakistan, it was, 
arguably, to integrate the western province and prevent dominance from the 
Bengalis.  When Musharraf pursued economic mega-projects in southern 
Balochistan, a stated goal was the improvement of the lives of the Baloch.204  
However, each of these policies and strategies aimed at integration has resulted 
in protest, strikes, violence, and an insurgent, anti-integration campaign. 
We find a similar result among the Bengalis.  They likewise protested, 
conducted province-wide strikes, and rioted.  They also mounted political 
campaigns to voice their grievances.   Like the Baloch, the Bengalis launched an 
insurgent campaign under the name Mukhti Bahini.  This group conducted a 
guerilla campaign for the state of Bangladesh.205 
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These similarities in behaviors from two significantly different peripheral 
ethnic groups suggest a weakness in the Baloch theory. Certain aspects of the 
Baloch theory may contribute to the problem of Baloch-Islamabad tensions.  
Specifically, the role of the Sardar is conclusive.  Should the Sardars uniformly 
submit to Islamabad’s rule, the problem of Baloch-Islamabad tensions could 
disappear overnight.  However, this evaluation of the theory offers conclusive 
evidence that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch are not the principle 
reasons for the problems between them and Islamabad. 
D. CONCLUSION  
The Baloch theory posits that the culture and capabilities of the Baloch 
most adequately explains the difficulty in their integration into Pakistan.  The 
culture of the Baloch puts the Sardar at the helm of the tribe.  According to the 
theory, the Sardar’s refusal to submit to Islamabad is due to their desire to 
maintain their political power and influence.  So, until the Sardars submit, there 
can be no integration.  The Baloch theory sees this as a primary cause of the 
Baloch tribes’ failure to integrate.  By studying the anthropological evidence of 
the nature of hierarchical tribes, it is clear that the role of the Sardars cannot be 
underestimated.  Their submission to Islamabad could spell an end to the 
Baloch-Islamabad tensions.  However, when comparing the Sardars’ reactions to 
Britain in 1876 to their reactions to Pakistan after 1947 suggests that the role of 
the central government ought not be ignored either.   
The theory also sees the influence of foreign sources upon the capabilities 
of the Baloch resistance as key to the problem.  If there is a “foreign hand” of 
influence among the Baloch, be it a foreign government or apolitical smuggling, it 
would serve to push them away from Islamabad.  It certainly cannot help them 
integrate into Pakistan.  This analysis finds no conclusive proof of foreign activity 
with the Baloch and doubts its relevance.  However, It seems that the most 
significant and demonstrable foreign factor is the illicit drug trade.  This shores up 
the insurgency and provides disincentives to integration. 
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Finally, this chapter compared the Baloch to the Bengalis of East 
Pakistan.  It found that despite differing culture and capabilities, they reacted in 
much the same manner towards similar policies from Islamabad.  This leads us 
to conclude that factors of culture and capability can contribute to tensions 
between Islamabad and peripheral ethnic groups.  However, it is far more likely 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. TWO THEORIES 
This thesis addressed the two competing theories of the problems 
between the Baloch and Islamabad.  On one hand is the Islamabad theory.  This 
theory claims that it is the policy of Islamabad and their strategies for attaining 
integration with the Baloch that has caused the lack of integration.  This theory 
contains three key components.  The first is the denial of democracy.  This 
component argues that Islamabad’s denial of democracy to the Baloch has been 
the driving force pushing the Baloch away from integration.  The second 
component is economic exploitation.  Citing natural resource expropriation, 
detrimental financial policies, and exclusion from national benefits, this 
component asserts that Islamabad’s economic policies towards the Baloch have 
hindered integration.  The Islamabad theory also argues that military excess 
towards the Baloch has not caused them to acquiesce and integrate with the 
nation.  Instead, it has pushed them further away.   This thesis then 
demonstrated the correlative nature of Baloch insurgent attacks and Islamabad’s 
policies throughout the fourth insurgency.  It then evaluated the response of the 
Baloch by looking at levels of insurgent attacks.  It found overwhelming evidence 
of a correlation between “sticks” and increased violence, as well as between 
“carrots” and decreased violence.  It showed that the Baloch insurgency is 
strongly affected by policy events originating in Islamabad.  This created a strong 
predictive tool for future policy choices.  It also gave significant support to the 
Islamabad theory. 
The second theory that this thesis addressed was the Baloch theory, an 
argument advocated by many in Pakistan.  This theory posits that it is the 
conditions within the Baloch people that have made national integration so 
difficult.  Two principle components emerge from this theory.  First is the cultural 
argument.  This argument asserts that the Sardars, the chiefs of the Baloch 
tribes, and their associated hierarchical system, the Sardari system, is a major 
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impediment to the national integration of the Baloch.  The second component of 
the Baloch theory is the capabilities argument.  It argues that the capabilities of 
the Baloch to resist integration into Pakistan have been significantly heightened 
because of foreign influences on the Baloch.  From foreign nations, namely India 
and Afghanistan to apolitical sources of influence, namely drugs and weapons 
smuggling, the foreign influences on the Baloch enable them to push away from 
Islamabad.  We further evaluated this theory by comparing the responses of the 
Baloch to Islamabad with the responses of the East Pakistani Bengalis to 
Islamabad.  If the Baloch theory was the best explanation of the Islamabad-
Baloch tensions, an analysis of these two peoples would yield different results in 
the reactions of these people groups to Islamabad.  Analysis instead 
demonstrated that the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the Pakistani Baloch 
reacted in a very similar manner to the policies of Islamabad.  This left the Baloch 
theory weakened.  
While the analysis demonstrated that the Baloch theory was likely not the 
prime cause of tensions between Islamabad and the Baloch, it did yield valid 
understandings about the hurdles to integration.  While not the instigators of the 
ongoing problems, the Sardars are in a hierarchical position to alleviate these 
tensions and integrate into Pakistan.  They are also, consequently, in a position 
to continue resistance and push for a separate nation.  The role of the Sardars is 
key. 
B. RESULTS 
This thesis evaluated both theories in detail.  In doing so, it achieved the 
following results.  Under the Baloch theory, it found that the cultural argument 
contributes significantly to the understanding of the Baloch problem.  It is 
extremely difficult for Islamabad to integrate a people whose powerful leaders 
stand in direct opposition to Islamabad’s control.  Furthermore, this thesis found 
that international influence is a factor among the Baloch.  In particular, the Baloch 
involvement in the illicit drug trade demands more attention. However, 
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international involvement is not significant enough to completely describe the 
reasons for Baloch difficulty in integration.  Furthermore, as we saw with the 
comparative study of the East Pakistani Bengalis to the Baloch, culture and 
capabilities did not determine the propensity of these people to fight Islamabad’s 
policies.  Consequently, the Baloch theory is likely not the primary cause of the 
failure of the Baloch to integrate into Pakistan. 
Following analysis of the Islamabad theory, this thesis found that 
Islamabad’s policies towards the Baloch have often backfired, resulting in less 
integration.  The most important policy has been the denial of democracy 
throughout Pakistan’s history.  This seems to delegitimize Islamabad in the eyes 
of the Baloch and only furthers their discontent.  In addition to the political 
component to the Islamabad theory, the economic policies of Islamabad have 
likewise pushed the Baloch away from integration. Biased policies, economic 
marginalization, and the denial of resources, have fostered strong nationalist 
sentiments.  The issue of military excess towards the Baloch damages chances 
for their national integration.  As a result, we saw that the policies of Islamabad 
towards the Baloch are probably the primary reason why we see the Baloch-
Islamabad tensions today. 
While this analysis shows that the Islamabad theory best explains the 
problems one sees in the Baloch-Islamabad relationship, it is dangerous to 
eliminate the Baloch theory.  One cannot look at the Baloch situation from the 
position of only one of these theories.  Appropriate analysis of problems between 
Islamabad and the Baloch must include both theories.  In particular, analysis 
must bear in mind the power of the Baloch culture as embodied in the Sardari 
system.  To ignore this is to ignore a critical component of the Baloch-Islamabad 
problem.  Additionally, one should not forget the power of democracy among the 
Baloch.  Democracy denied will invariably result in violent uprisings. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The final section of this thesis makes recommendations to policymakers in 
the United States, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan.  They reflect the author’s 
desire to see the Baloch integrated into the mainstream of Pakistani social, 
political, and economic life.  These recommendations also reflect the author’s 
desire to see a peaceful, prosperous Pakistan as well as a stable subcontinent. 
1. United States 
As relations with Pakistan continue to be vital to U.S. policy in South Asia, 
the United States should take the following four steps. 
First, the United States needs a cadre of policy makers who understand 
the principles outlines in this thesis. The Baloch-Islamabad problem does not 
currently pose such a critical issue as the Taliban in Pakistan.  However, while 
not a “hot issue,” it is clear that if left unchecked, the Baloch problem could have 
significant strategic implications.  In conversations with military officers at the 
author’s institution, a military graduate school, it became evident that few leaders 
are aware of Pakistan’s “other” problem.  Kissinger’s ignorance in 1962 is still 
reflected in many parts of the U.S. government today.   
Second, as seen by this thesis, the presence of democracy for the Baloch 
leads to a decrease in violence.  The United States should encourage Pakistan 
to keep democratic gains intact.  While not a new issue in Islamabad-Washington 
dialogues, the maintenance of democracy in Pakistan is vital for its survival.     
Third, the Obama administration has placed more emphasis on 
accountability for the aid given to Pakistan.  The Kerry-Lugar Bill symbolizes this 
as it places significant conditions on U.S. financial backing of Pakistan.  While 
this has angered many in Pakistan, it is a responsible step away from previous 
funding.  It is an affront to American interests for the advancement of democracy 
to arm Pakistani action against the Baloch.  Additionally, Washington must be 
careful as it considers the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles to Pakistan.  These 
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drones, while touted as being “unarmed,“ could be easily modified and used to 
strike Baloch villages.  This will only exacerbate the problem in Balochistan. 
Finally, the United States must place a greater emphasis on stemming the 
tide of illegal drugs out of Afghanistan.  This provides funding for the Baloch 
insurgents and weakens the law and order situation in Balochistan.  It may also, 
as argued in this thesis, give incentive for the insurgents to continue their fight 
and avoid resolution. 
2. Pakistan 
Undoubtedly, the player with the greatest challenge in this situation is the 
government of Pakistan.  It has options, though, which must be considered if it 
wants to avoid a worst-case scenario in Balochistan. 
First, Pakistan needs to ensure that democracy is a fixed element of 
Baloch society.  This is the fastest way to achieve Baloch integration. The 
transition to civilian rule following Musharraf’s departure is encouraging.  
Furthermore, the deliberate steps of the Senate in 2005 and President Zardari in 
2008 to address Baloch grievances have proven to reduce violence.   
The ultimate crisis among the Baloch is the lack of legitimacy for 
Islamabad.  In the Baloch mind, the government, an outside source of authority, 
is illegitimate.  What can Islamabad do to change this situation?  The government 
of Pakistan asserts that Indian rule over Indian administered Kashmir is 
illegitimate without a plebiscite confirming India’s authority.  This thesis 
challenges Pakistan to extend the same logic to Balochistan.  Were the 
government to win a plebiscite in Balochistan, particularly among the Baloch 
tribes, it would be a massive blow to the insurgency and would significantly 
bolster Baloch integration. 
The second major challenge for Islamabad is to address the Sardari 
system.  Islamabad must understand the Sardari system and work with it, not 
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against it.  It must learn how to co-opt the Sardars as the British did.  It must 
encourage dialogue between the center and the periphery.   
The government of Pakistan needs to refrain from utilizing their military to 
establish their authority among the Baloch.  As this thesis demonstrates, military 
action against the Baloch increases insurgent violence and creates long lasting 
memories.  This includes disappearances and the excessive use of paramilitary 
forces. 
Finally, the government of Pakistan needs to extend economic 
opportunities to Baloch, especially in Gwadar.  While Gwadar port was initially 
billed as an economic boon to the locals, it has not proven that way.  Baloch 
fears of Gwadar upsetting their majority in Balochistan are gaining traction in 
recent news reports.206   
If Pakistan can continue the pattern of democracy in Baloch, refrain from 
military excess, reach out to the Sardars, and provide economic development, 
the situation with the Baloch may be brought back from the brink.  Furthermore, it 
is possible that the Baloch could actually integrate into the mainstream of 
Pakistani life. 
3. India and Afghanistan 
While the international community is not in agreement on India’s or 
Afghanistan’s involvement with the Baloch separatist movement, one thing is 
clear.  Involvement is not in their best interests.  It is detrimental to regional 
stability and compromises their security as well as energy interests in the region.  
A destabilized Balochistan spells only trouble for both India and Afghanistan. 
Consequently, the governments of India and Afghanistan should cease 
operations, if any exist, which promote the instability of Pakistan.  They should 
assist the Baloch in creating the conditions within Pakistan and Afghanistan to 
receive the TAPI pipeline, which will transit both Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
                                            
206  Aleem Maqbool, "Balochistan Reaches a Boiling Point," BBC News, January 10, 2010. 
 79
D. CONCLUSION 
All parties involved with the Baloch and Pakistan must understand that we 
cannot examine the Baloch-Islamabad problem through the lens of only one 
theory.  This problem is not strictly a result of the Baloch people and their 
environment, hostile that it is to integration.  Nor is this problem completely the 
fault of the central government of Pakistan.  As policymakers appreciate the 
points enumerated in this thesis, a more complete image of the Baloch-
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